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IV
Rector Magnificus, 
Dames en Heren, Ladies and Gentlemen,
1. Introduction
1.1 Employment as a fundamental right
Employment is a fundamental right in modern society.1 The De-
claration concerning the aims and purpose of the International La-
bour Organization (ILO) points out to us that one of the basic
principles of social justice is that ‘…all human beings, irrespective of
race, creed or sex, have the right to pursue both their material well-
being and their spiritual development in conditions of freedom and
dignity, of economic security and equal opportunity.’2 All individuals
are entitled to exploit and further develop their working capabilities,
yet it is necessary to embed employment in a contract in order to
secure rights and obligations and make the individual employment fit
with the workplace. A contract, however, by its nature is terminable.
And here, in the face of termination of the employment contract, the
individual employee will always be in a weaker negotiating position
than his counterpart, the employer. This has nothing to do with size of
the employer, but simply with the concept of ownership. Since the
employer has ownership of the work, the workplace and its resources,
it is he who is the ultimate decision maker on the distribution of
employment, it is the employer who decides who gets access to
employment and who does not. So when we return to the fundamental
nature of employment for the individual, protection of the worker
1
1. On 10 December 1948, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopted and
proclaimed that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights Article 23(1) of the
charter proclaims: ‘Everyone has the right to work, to free choice of employment,
to just and favourable conditions of work and to protection against un-
employment’; also see International Treaty on economic, social and cultural rights
of 19 december 1966, Trb. 1969, 100, art. 6.1: ‘The states parties to the present
Covenant recognize the right to work, which includes the right of everyone to the
opportunity to gain his living by work he freely chooses or accepts, and will take
appropriate steps to safeguard this right.’
2. Declaration concerning the aims and purpose of the International Labour
Organisation, annex to the constitution of the ILO, Trb. 1975, 102 (‘Philadelphia
Declaration of the ILO’).
against termination is necessary, by which I mean against both
unlawful termination and the possible consequences of termination as
such.
The ILO defined this in its Convention concerning Termination of
Employment at the initiative of the employer3 in article 4:
‘The employment of a worker shall not be terminated unless there is a
valid reason for such termination connected with the capacity or conduct
of the worker based on the operational requirements of the undertaking,
establishment or service.’4
And in article 11 and 12:
‘A worker whose employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a
reasonable period of notice or compensation in lieu thereof, unless he is
guilty of serious misconduct, that is misconduct of such a nature that it
would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue his
employment during the notice period.’
‘A worker whose employment has been terminated shall be entitled, in
accordance with national law and practice with (a) a severance allowance
or other separation benefits, the amount of which shall be based inter alia
on length of service and the level of wages, and paid directly by the
employer or by a fund constituted by employers’ contributions (….)’.
So if protection is necessary, a triangular tension is generated between
employment, contract and termination, and the question arises: how
do we create a form and level of protection that is adequate to
preserve the working individual’s right of access to employment and
all that follows from it on the one hand – and on the other hand
protection that does not frustrate or hamper this very same access to
employment as well as his position within the workplace? Moreover,
how do we achieve protection that does not have a detrimental effect
on the worker, the workplace and its development?
2
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3. Only 33 countries have ratified the Convention so far, among which is not the
Netherlands. Nonetheless, the Convention provides a useful guideline and its
content is achieved with the consensus of all ILO Member States.
4. ILO Convention no. 158 concerning termination of Employment at the initiative 
of the employer, 22 June 1982 (‘ILO Convention on the Termination of
Employment)’.
In other words: if we use the wrong methods to protect the individual
worker against loss of employment through termination, we run the
risk that the employer may decide not to contract with this employee
in the first place.
It is this interesting dilemma that was at the heart of the troubles in
France early in 2006, when youth protests broke out on a large scale
against a legislative proposal aimed to provide equal opportunities in
employment5. The proposed statute created a ‘first employment
contract’ (called the Contrat de Premiere embauche or CPE). This CPE was
a new type of employment contract for youths under 26, which
essentially contained a two-year trial period: during the first two years
the employer would be able to terminate the contract without having
to justify the termination. The central dilemma was: if the legislator
reduces the level of employment protection for young workers, they
may find it easier to get access to jobs and job experience, but they will
also lose what they gained much more easily because of the lack of
employment protection in the first two years. Opposed to that, one
could argue: if employment protection for young workers without
relevant working experience is at the same level for workers who
already have such working experience, employers may become
increasingly reluctant to hire young workers. The protests that swept
through the country forced the Villepin-administration to withdraw
the proposal: another law was passed and published very swiftly
withdrawing the controversial CPE, replacing it with provisions aimed
to help young people with special difficulties to find employment6.
Protection of individual workers against termination of employment
requires a model that is well attuned to modernised economies, which,
although perhaps divided into sub-economies of local or specialist
nature, are all highly influenced by: (1) internationalisation, if not
globalisation; (2) technological developments and the unpredictability
of their consequences; and (3) the unprecedented rise of universal
communication. 
In a recent analysis report McKinsey & Co.7 points out that today,
Asia (excluding Japan) accounts for 13 per cent of world GDP, while
3
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5. Loi no. 2006-396 du 31 Mars 2006 pour l’égalité des chances; Journ. Off. de
2.4.2006.
6. Loi no. 2006-457 du 21 avril 2006 sur l’accès des jeunes a la vie active en enterprise,
Journ. Off. 22.4.2006.
7. I. Davis/E. Stephenson, Ten trends to watch in 2006, www.mckinsey&co.com.
Western Europe accounts for more than 30 per cent. Within the next
20 years the two numbers will nearly be reversed. Some industries and
services – manufacturing and IT services, for example – will shift even
more dramatically. As the researchers write and I quote: 
‘More transformational than technology itself is the shift and behaviour
that it enables. We work not just globally but also instantaneously. We are
forming communities and relationships in new ways (indeed, 12 per cent
of US newly-weds last year met online). More than 2 billion people now use
cell phones. We send 9 trillion e-mails a year. We do a billion google
searches a day, more than a half in languages other than English. For
perhaps the first time in history, geography is not the primary constraint
on the limits of social and economic organisation.’ 
And again: 
‘Ongoing shifts in labour and talent will be far more profound in the
widely observed migration of jobs to low-wage countries. The shift to
knowledge-intensive industries highlights the importance and scarcity of
well-trained talent. The increasing integration of global labour markets,
however, is opening up vast new talent sources.’ 
But this is not all. Already by 2000 more than half of the world’s largest
budgets were budgets not of states but of multinational corporations
or groups8. These corporations have taken over the centre of social
control and coordination. In this respect states have become less
important: 
‘They will continue to be the major players on the world stage but
governments will have less and less control over flows of information,
technology, diseases, migrants, arms and financial transactions, whether
licit or illicit, across their borders.’9
Globalization has in the past decades led to Western European
economies, voluntarily or involuntarily, developing in the direction of
a hybrid of highly specialised industries and services. And where rights
and obligations have reached a level of high sophistication in those
4
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8. Lord Wedderburn, Common law, labour law, global law, in: Social and labour rights
in a global context, Cambridge 2002, p. 42.
9. US National Foreign Intelligence Board, A dialogue about the future with non-
Government Experts, Washington 2000.
same Western European economies, it has become very important to
evaluate the models and means for employment protection in those
economies, and subsequently improve and implement the necessary
changes. What can happen at a micro-economic level could also
happen on a national scale: employers denying individual workers
access to employment on a national market because the rules of
protection are prohibitive. 
There should be no misunderstanding of what I am proposing: I am
not saying that we, in our Western European economic systems and
closely related labour markets, should downgrade the levels of
protection for workers back to square one, or to the protection level of
those upcoming economies that, among others things, still allow child
labour and horrendous working conditions to continue. The fact that
the world and especially the markets around us are radically changing,
does not mean that we should change our prerogatives on social and
labour rights. As the ILO-director wrote in one of his recent annual
reports: Values can be defended, even when market demand
changes.10 One should bear in mind as well, as McKinsey also points
out in its analysis11, that ‘…many emerging-market governments will
have to decide what level of social services to provide to citizens who
increasingly will be asking for state-provided protections such as health
care and retirement security.’
Sciarra draws our attention to the need for rebalancing and re-
establishing social rights in an EU market that has been preoccupied
with competitiveness as its primary goal. She refers to Deakin and
Wilkinson saying that social rights far from being inimical to the
effective functioning of the labour market are actually at the core of a
labour market in which the resources available to a society, in the form
of the potential labour power of its members is fully realised. When
commenting on the meaning of the Albany-decision of the European
Court of Justice12 she writes: 
5
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10. M. Hansenne, Defending values, promoting change, Director-General’s report,
ILO, Geneva, 1994.
11. I. Davis/E. Stephenson, Ten trends to watch in 2006, l.c.
12. Case C-67/96, Albany International B.V. vs. Stichting Bedrijfspensioenfonds
Textielindustrie [1999] ECR I-5751.
‘The inclusion of fundamental rights within the European legal system
would not be a mere repetition of existing rights. It would rather serve the
purpose of creating a collective area strong enough to interact with
competition law.’13
So there is every need to reconsider the present means of protection
of workers. The greatest challenge is then to establish a system for the
protection of workers that on the one hand provides for the rights of
workers being sufficiently safeguarded, yet on the other hand in the
near future is resilient enough to withstand the dissimilarity of working
conditions and pay levels between different parts of communicating
markets. 
The purpose of this lecture is to establish how this ménage a trois
of employment, contract and termination could be resolved to such
extent that we can create a protective system that above all is
sufficiently protective and helpful to the working individual, but is also
as much as possible favourable to his employer, his working
environment and, last but not least, favourable to our Western
European market position. More specifically I will try to address the
question whether protection of employment is well served by a system
of prior authorisation, meaning a legal system in which an employer is
not allowed to terminate any employment contract unless he has
acquired prior authorisation, either from a government agency or
from an independent court. Interestingly, the ILO Convention on the
Termination of Employment does not mention any requirement of
prior authorisation by either government authority or court of law. It
merely requires that the employer must give the employee the
opportunity to defend himself against any allegations that are ground
for an intended termination by his employer.14
An overall look into the entire European Community economy and/or
its constituent parts of twenty-five member states would require much
more than a one-hour lecture, or even sixty-or-so printed pages. As
the EU treaty still requires unanimity for EU legislation on the subject
of protection of workers where their employment contract is
6
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13. S. Sciarra, Market freedom and fundamental rights, in: Social and labour rights in
a global context, Cambridge 2002, p. 110.
14. Article 7 of the ILO Convention on the Termination of Employment.
terminated15, and as the legislation in most EU member states is still
quite diverse, it would be difficult to design a pan-European plan at
this moment for a system of protection. I would see it as one of the
challenges of my position on this chair in Maastricht to investigate the
various national systems more deeply and to try to extract common
denominators and shared principles that could be used as building
blocks to create such a pan-European design. I adhere to Lord
Wedderburn’s view that given the conflicting aims of powerful
multinationals and weakened states, all means must be considered
whereby fundamental labour standards and principles can be created,
upheld and enforced in the global market, and I would think that
harmonisation of EU labour law would certainly seem be an aid to that
purpose. 16,17
1.2 Prior authorisation within Western Europe
As regards the subject of prior authorisation, it is easy to observe that
most Western European systems do not have a system of prior
authorisation for termination of employment. From a recent survey in
twelve EU member states18 it follows that eleven out of these twelve
countries do not have any prior authorisation requirements for
termination of employment at all. Indeed all these countries have in
one form or another implemented the EU Directive on the
approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to collective
redundancies,19 although it should be noted that this Directive only
deals with consultation and negotiation between employer and
7
THE END OF THE AFFAIR
15. Article 137.1 under (d) in conjunction with article 137.2 and article 251 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Community, as amended in accordance with the
Treaty of Nice Consolidated Treaty (OJ 2002 C325/1-184) and the Accession Treaty
(OJ 2003 L236/17).
16. Lord Wedderburn, l.c. p. 50.
17. I would not agree with Sciarra l.c. p. 102, that it is arguable ‘that diverse national
systems of labour and social law across the member states of the EU enhance the
competitiveness of the EU as a whole, provided core labour standards are
maintained’.
18. Survey on individual dismissal rights in Belgium, Czech Republic, France, Germa-
ny, Hungary, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands, Poland Slovakia, Spain and UK, publ.
Allen & Overy 2005, www.allenovery.com.
19. EU Directive on the approximation of the laws of the Member States relating to
collective redundancies. Orig. 75/129, later 92/56, now 98/59 of 20 July 1998, full
text publication as in Blackstone EC Legislation, 2005-2006, 16th Edition, Oxford
(UK) (‘EU Directive 98/59’).
workers’ representatives, and it only requires a notification by the
employer of any projected collective redundancy so as to enable the
competent public authority ‘....to seek solutions to the problems raised by the
projected collective redundancy’, which of course is not the same thing as
prior authorisation. Also, the rules on unfair dismissal in most of these
twelve countries are elaborate, to say the least, and can result in the
annulment of the dismissal, in certain countries even allowing the
option of reinstatement by the court. Often, they result in additional
compensation, payable to the employee. In most countries, some level
of severance pay based on a fixed formula is due in any dismissal
situation, with the exception of dismissals for urgent cause, yet the
legitimacy of the dismissal itself can only be tested afterwards: there is
no such thing as prior authorisation. 
There was a prior authorisation system in France, which was abolished
in 1975 except for dismissals on commercial grounds. In 1986 the
scheme was abolished entirely.20 In Spain, government authorities can
block a collective redundancy in the fifteen days following the end of
negotiations between unions and employer21, but such a system does
not result in a full prior authorisation system. In Germany a non-
binding advice from the Betriebsrat, the works council, is required for
an intended dismissal, relating to redundancy; a rule that can hardly
be seen as prior authorisation. The UK certainly has no prior
authorisation system. The fact that the British have statutory dispute
resolution procedures, together with a Code of Disciplinary Practice and
Procedures in Employment which deals with rules of internal procedures
in case of an intended dismissal, and the fact that they have in place an
optional voluntary mediation system in case of a dismissal through the
Advisory Conciliation and Arbitration Service (ACAS)22, all show that
a sophisticated level of protection has been set up to protect
employees against unfair or unlawful loss of their unemployment – but
all these systems are a long way from prior authorisation.
But still; in eleven out of twelve countries no prior authorisation for
termination of employment is required. 
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20. See L. van der Geest a.o., Bescherming en economische efficientie: een alternatief
ontslagstelsel, NYFER Institute June 2000.
21. Article 51 paragraph 5 of the Workers’ Statute and – in more detail – article 11 of
the Royal Decree 43/1996, 19 January 1996.
22. www.acas.org.uk.
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There is one small country, however, that has such a system, and many
decision makers its labour market claim that this concept of prior
authorisation forms the foundation of its so-called ‘polder’ success. If
nothing else, the fact that eleven out of twelve EU member states,
never have bothered to set up this kind of – allegedly – successful
system, begs for a closer look at this small country. As if we were the
readers of an Asterix adventure when at the beginning its authors take
us from a bird’s-eye view nearer and nearer towards ‘that one small
village of indomitable Gauls that still holds out to the Roman
invaders’, as the books invariably begin, let us look at the one country
that ‘holds out’ among the other EU-countries in its very own
protective system of employment termination, not just for that very
extraordinary poldermodel of employee protection, but primarily
because the Dutch have a system that dates back to the Second World
War and has been the subject of discussion for decades. 
I would like to use today’s lecture to see what lessons can be learned
from that very Dutch Model. Does the poldermodel really represent
the best possible solution for proper and proportional employees’
protection in a future that may show a war of the markets and
economies? 
So let us take that closer look.
1.3 A general outline of the Dutch system
The Dutch system is a so-called dual system of protection, afforded
either by the governmental authority Centre for Work and Income
(CWI), or the Cantonal Court Section of the District Court. 
The following general rule lies at the heart of the Dutch legal system
regarding employment termination. In the Netherlands, with the
exception of situations of mutual consent between parties or dismissal
for urgent cause (ontslag op staande voet), an employment contract may
not be terminated lawfully without prior authorisation:
1. either through prior approval from the CWI; or
2. through a court decision to dissolve the contract on serious
grounds (ontbinding wegens gewichtige reden).
As of now I will use the term ‘prior authorisation’ (in Dutch: preventieve
toets) as the family name for these two different authorisation forms.
And I will use the term ‘termination’ as a generic term for all forms of
termination of employment relating to the capacity or conduct of the
worker or based on the operational requirements of his employer’s
business. This means that this lecture is not about any form of unlawful
termination on ground of handicap, disease, union membership,
membership of a works council, pregnancy, sex, race, colour, belief,
marital status, religion, political opinion, social origin or sexual
orientation. 23
Hence the central question of today’s lecture is: 
Is a system of prior authorisation through either a government
body or an independent court the appropriate method of
protection for employees against undue termination?
Consider that we are, here, in the phase of the relationship where at
least one party feels it’s the end of the affair. The triangular tension of
employment, contract and termination is suddenly transformed –
when the end of the affair is nigh – into a triangle of protection, cost
and practicability: the latter not only for the employer, who might want
to get rid of his employee, but also for the employee, because at the
end of every affair, of whatever nature, the essential question inevitably
arises: should I stay or should I go? 
A closer study of the Dutch situation is also interesting because of the
intense nature of the debate on this subject in past decades. Prior
authorisation was not a subject open to nuances in the discussion. You
were either for or against it. More than one proposal to change the
system was launched but withdrawn long before the finishing line, as
shown by Verhulp in an article from 2004.24
I would like to take a closer look at the prior authorisation system’s
history, its facts and statistics, its practical truth or untruth, and of
course the philosophy and meaning that lies behind it.
I shall begin with a short history of employee protection under Dutch
law in the last two centuries.
10
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23. As listed in articles 5 and 6 of the ILO Convention on the Termination of
Employment.
24. E. Verhulp, Ontslagrecht in beweging?, in: Ontslagrecht in beweging, ’s-Graven-
hage 2004, p. 11-12.
I do realise that every historic account has its subjective elements.
Anyone who wants to criticise my perspective from the onset, can start
by picking some soft targets, such as pointing out that I was born post-
baby-boom, that I have never tasted Dutch tulip bulbs in wartime, that I
was nowhere to be found – not even conceived – at the great flood of
1953 (Watersnoodramp), and that I merely associate the great oil crisis of
1973 with the strange phenomenon of carless instead of careless
Sundays. But that doesn’t render my perspective any less valid than
that of anyone else. Let me quote to you the first line of that great
novel of Graham Greene, ‘The End of the Affair’, where he writes:
‘A story has no beginning or end: arbitrarily one chooses that moment
of experience from which to look back or from which to look ahead.’25
2. A brief history of the Dutch system26
Originally the Dutch Civil Code (DCC) of 1838 did not contain any
provisions for the protection of employees. Employers were entitled to
get rid of employees without any compensation or specific notice
period. It was not until 1907, following the implementation of the
Employment Contract Act, that the Dutch legislator tried to give the
employee some protection: the employer from then on had to observe
a certain notice period – still short compared to present standards, but
at least providing the employee with some security. But the rules of
termination were abstract, in that the ground for termination could
not be tested before a court. 
When the Germans occupied the Netherlands in 1940 they very
soon decreed that employment contracts could only be terminated
after approval was acquired from the authorities. The German
administrators claimed this was done to avoid mass unemployment;
however, one could argue that the true reason for implementing this
requirement for prior approval was to be able to monitor the
employment market and have more of an overview on who and how
many people might be available for the war industry in the German
homeland. This can be deduced in my view also from the fact that as
11
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25. Graham Greene, The End of the Affair, first published by William Heinemann Ltd
of London in 1951, excerpt taken from Vintage Books Edition 2001, page 1.
26. See C.G. Scholtens, Evaluatie artikel 6 BBA, historie en toekomst, SMA ed. 1992, p.
476 et al., C.G. Scholtens, Evaluatie artikel 6 BBA, historie en toekomst (II):
Wanneer wordt het vrede?, SMA 2003, p. 292 et al., C.G. Scholtens, Ontstaansge-
schiedenis van het ontslagverbod van artikel 6 BBA in 1940-1945.
of 1943 not only employers, but also employees were obliged to ask for
prior approval. The Dutch War cabinet, when preparing emergency
legislation for the period directly after the end of WW II, decided to
continue this system of prior approval out of fear of chaos on the
labour market directly after the war. So then the Extraordinary Decree
on Labour Relations, the Buitengewoon Besluit Arbeidsverhoudingen, was
born, in 1945. It may interest those with a passion for war history that
the decree was signed by General Winkelman, supreme commander of
the Dutch armed forces. The prior approval requirement was hence
retained. Originally it was the Director of the County Labour Bureau,
(Directeur Gewestelijk Arbeidsbureau), who was the competent authority in
this field. Later, between 1991 and 2002, it was the Regional Director
of Employment Strategy, the RDA, and as of 2002 the assessment is
made by the – regional – Centre for Work and Income, the CWI. 
It should be noted that the authority that decides on approval
permits for termination of employment contracts is a government
body, coming under the responsibility of the Ministry of Social Affairs
and Employment (Ministerie van SZW).
Although the Decree of 1945 and the derivative rules based upon it
have indeed been modernised since 1945 and prior approval is no
longer required for employees27, the system of prior approval is still in
force today as it was in 1945 – and technically more or less still the
same as the German occupation forces intended in 1940 – for some
like myself a harrowing thought, for others perhaps more evidence
that truth is stranger than fiction. 
Meanwhile, in the arena of the Civil Code, matters relating to the
termination of employment contracts developed as well. Since an
employment contract still falls within the scope of civil law, being a
contract between two autonomous contracting parties, it became clear
in the 1950s that a change was required to achieve adequate protection
for workers. In 1953 a large-scale modernisation of Dutch employment
law led, among other things, to the inclusion of the rule of manifestly
unreasonable dismissal, kennelijk onredelijk ontslag: if an employer
terminated the employment contract under circumstances that
qualified as manifestly unreasonable, the employee could afterwards
12
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27. The prior approval requirement for employees formally disappeared following the
Act on Flexibility and Security in Employment that came into force on 1 January
1999. Before this time, the Netherlands was found to be in breach of the treaties on
forced labour, such as the ILO Convention no. 29 on Forced Labour: see e.g. the
observations of the ILO’s Committee of Experts on the Application of Conventions
and Recommendations (CEACR), 1990, 60th session. 
(that is: after prior approval had been given and subsequent notice by
the employer had followed) claim a severance payment from the
court. Then, from the 1980s onwards, the original ‘dead letter’ of the
possibility to ask for dissolution of the employment contract by the
competent cantonal court28 began to gain more and more significance
in practice. Apparently employers found the prior approval
proceedings under the Decree of 1945 too slow or time- and energy
consuming. Also, whereas the competent CWI could refuse permission
quite easily if it found that it was not in the interest of the labour
market situation – very interesting when we realise that this is about
individual dismissals –, the cantonal court could still dissolve the
contract if it found there were serious grounds, gewichtige redenen, for
such dissolution, which in most cases could already be found in the
presence of a strained working relationship – whatever that is or may
be. And so it developed into a practice where at the turn of the
century, and in the years since then, the number of court dissolutions
of employment contracts, around 70,000 a year, and the number of
CWI-terminations after prior approval, around 80,000, have been
more or less in equilibrium. 
The cantonal court judge is independent and does not in any way
have to justify his decision to any government authority; nor is he
obliged to follow any policy set out by the cabinet. The cantonal court
judge is empowered to award a fair and reasonable severance payment
to the employee, if he decides to do so, whereas the CWI cannot in any
way order the payment of a severance or redundancy payment or even
put pressure upon the employer to do so. 
Setting aside the differences between the cantonal court
proceedings and the CWI proceedings, they both have one common
denominator: during the years in which the prior authorisation
system, of which each form of proceedings is a species, developed, it
progressively achieved its main objective, which was to offer protection
to employees against the danger of being lightly dismissed, or should
I say: against light dismissal (by which I mean a dismissal that has no
sufficient justification). 
But this is not yet the whole story.
First of all, collective dismissals have been regulated for the past
decades by the Collective Redundancies Act, which in fact followed
13
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28. On the history of this article see: C.J. Loonstra, Het bereik van de ontbindingspro-
cedure ex art. 1639w BW, Nijmegen 1995; and C.J. Loonstra, De kantonrechter als
arbeidsrechter, Deventer 2000.
from the EU Directive on the approximation of the laws of the
Member States relating to collective redundancies.29 Yet in the case of
a collective redundancy, prior approval of the CWI is still required. 
Secondly, in 1999 the Act on Flexibility and Security in
Employment was implemented in the Dutch Civil Code. This Act
introduced, among many other new provisions, the possibility for
employers to extend fixed term contracts for up to three years – and
even allowed them to extend that period further, provided that this
was agreed with the unions in a collective bargaining agreement. 
Thirdly, the Dutch Civil Code of course contains some powerful
provisions to ensure the protection of pregnant women, sick people
and works council members. The contracts of employees who fall into
any of those categories may not be terminated, either by a court
decision to dissolve the contract or by giving notice after prior
approval, if the reason for termination is related to pregnancy,
sickness, disability or works council membership. 
Fourth, a dismissal for urgent cause, ontslag op staande voet, does not
require dissolution of the contract by the court or prior approval by
the CWI. Dismissals for urgent causes are those rather clear-cut cases
of theft, fraud, gross misconduct and unacceptable behaviour.
Fifth, and finally, from 1 October 2006 the Dutch Unemployment
Insurance Act (UIA), the Werkloosheidswet (WW), will perhaps for the
first time ever have a very clear requirement for the refusal of
unemployment benefit to an employee who has lost his job: in short,
he must have been dismissed with urgent cause. Until 1 October 2006,
the UIA has been using the criterion that an employee who could be
held responsible for the loss of his job could be refused
unemployment benefit. In many cases, where there was no urgent
cause for dismissal at all, this has led to the standard practice of
employer and employee in fact being in agreement about the desire
for termination of the contract, the end date, and the severance
payment to be paid, purely formally requesting a court decision for
dissolution, or also purely formally, requesting approval from the CWI,
in which proceedings they unequivocally stated that the employee was
not to blame for the termination and in that respect was not
responsible for the loss of his job; all this simply to safeguard the
employee’s right to unemployment benefit. It goes without saying that
these formal proceedings had no more than a ritual meaning, which
went even so far in the formal court proceedings that parties informed
the court or the CWI that they did not wish any court hearing. 
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As we will see later, the Ministry of SZW expects that the number of
cases before cantonal courts and CWI will decrease by a total of 60,000,
two-fifths of the present total number of cases.
3. The facts and statistics of the prior authorisation system
When lawyers leap towards statistics and empirical evidence, a caveat is
not out of place. Whether this comes from a lack of mathematical
understanding of your average lawyer or from lawyer’s second nature,
as a species, to jump to conclusions, is not for me to say. In any case, if
one looks at figures, facts and statistics it is not at all necessary to
choose sides in the everlasting debate on whether they tell the truth or
just lies. Every picture tells a story, and in my opinion the same applies
to statistics, figures and facts.
3.1 Number of prior authorisation proceedings
In the past three years the number of prior authorisation proceedings
was as follows30:
2005 2004 2003
Through CWI 74450 89494 85881
Through Cantonal Courts 67608 72011 78491
Total 142058 161505 164372
Relative relationship between number of CWI 
and Cantonal Court cases 1,1:1 1,24:1 1,1:1
The comparative relationship between CWI-cases and Cantonal Court
cases has been more or less the same since 1998, the CWI slightly
outnumbering the Cantonal Court in all years except 1998. The year
2005 saw a first reduction in both forms of prior authorisation
proceedings, and it looks as if this will continue in 2006, even without
taking into account the abolition of so-called formal proceedings as of
1 October 2006. In the first quarter of 2006 the number of CWI-
proceedings was down 26%, more significantly the requests for
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30. Data from Jaarrapportages Ontslagstatistiek of het Ministry of SZW of 2000-2005
(‘Ontslagstatistiek SZW’); C.J. Loonstra and P. Kruit, Statistiek Ontbindingsvergoe-
dingen 2005: een jaar van stabiliteit, in the practical law review Arbeidsrecht,
Edition 2006, 6/7, nr. 38 (‘Loonstra/Kruit’).
approval on economic grounds was down 32%. It seems that the
recovery in the economy is the main reason for this. Loonstra and
Kruit in their annual article on the subject of statistics on severance
payments31 claim that there was no economic recovery in 2005, which
in their opinion means that the reason for the drop cannot be found
in market developments, but I tend to disagree with them.
The percentage of economic growth in the Netherlands in 2005 was
1, 5% and in the first quarter of 2006 already was 2, 9%32. Interesting
further evidence of economic recovery can be found in the growth in
turnover of temporary employment agencies since 2004, always an
indicator of the beginnings of economic recovery and growth33.
3.2 Estimated number of formal proceedings
There are no exact statistics available about the number of formal
proceedings included in the statistics on CWI and cantonal court
proceedings, mentioned in para 3.1. 
The Ministry of SZW34 has presented some fairly accurate estimates
in the Parliamentary documentation on the recent Amendment of the
Unemployment Insurance Act. Here, the Ministry estimates the
number of formal proceedings before the cantonal court to be 45,000
per year, and the number of formal proceedings before the CWI to be
20,000 per year, based on the existing total numbers of approximately
70,000 cantonal court proceedings and 75,000 CWI proceedings per
year over the past couple of years.
This would mean that, based on the 2005 statistics, the estimated
numbers for CWI and cantonal court proceedings for 2007, other
factors absent such as economic recovery, would be as follows
2007
CWI 55,000
Cantonal Court 25,000
In total 80,000
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31. Loonstra/Kruit, p. 20.
32. Statistics from the Dutch Central Bureau of Statistics, see www.cbs.nl.
33. A brief yet interesting analysis of this phenomenon can be found in NRC Handels-
blad, financial pages, edition of 22 July 2006.
34. See the Nota naar aanleiding van het Verslag 30370, p. 63.
The implementation of the Amended Unemployment Insurance Act
on 1 October 2006 will therefore already result in the number of prior
authorisation proceedings being almost halved. 
3.2.1 The cost saving as a result of the abolition of formal prior
authorisation proceedings
As we have seen, the Amended Unemployment Insurance Act will
result in the abolition of formal prior authorisation proceedings. In all
those cases where parties have a serious desire to agree on termination
and severance pay by mutual consent, where there is no urgent cause
at play, they can simply agree on termination, set an end date for the
employment contract, deal with the severance pay and subsequently
each go their own separate way without the necessity of a formal
authorisation of the CWI or the cantonal court. The cost saving for all
parties concerned is quite substantial. 
administrative costs out-of-pocket expenses
Employers E 9 million E 100 million
Cantonal Court E 4 to 5 million
CWI E 1.5 million
The out-of-pocket expenses of employers are court costs, lawyers costs
and costs of employment (extra wages during the duration of the
proceedings).
The total administrative costs for employers as a result of the
present rules and legislation on employment termination amount to
R 65 million, which means that a cut in proceedings by half through
the abolition of formal proceedings alone would result in a reduction
of 14%. 
3.3 Reasons for termination in CWI-proceedings
There are no statistics available relating to the various reasons for
employers to request for dissolution of employment by the court.
However such statistics are available when it comes to CWI-
proceedings.
Employers present various reasons when requesting prior approval
for termination from the CWI:
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2005 2004 2003
Individual cases
Economic/Financial Reasons 56% 57% 54%
Sickness/Disability 22% 21% 25%
Other reasons 7% 6% 6%
Collective dismissals for economic/financial reasons 15% 16% 15%
In total 100% 100% 100%
Termination in the case of sickness/disability is only allowed through
dissolution if the grounds for termination are entirely unconnected to
the sickness or disability. Termination by giving notice after having
acquired the approval of the CWI is only allowed if the sickness or
disability has continued for at least two calendar years. 
This is a very interesting aspect of the system, because a worker who
has become chronically ill still merits his seniority and years of service
in the company. Yet because he has been ill for these two consecutive
years, he completely loses sight of entitlement to a severance payment
related to the years of seniority that he built up before his chronic
illness struck him.
3.4 Costs of prior authorisation proceedings
There are a number of sources to turn to when trying to determine the
costs incurred by employers when seeking termination. 
In 2000 the independent research agency ‘Research voor Beleid’
carried out research at the request of both the Ministry of Justice and
the Ministry of SZW35. The agency researched the cost of termination
for employers in proceedings for prior authorisation. These costs, so it
appeared, amounted on average to R 5,000 for every CWI-case and
R 27,000 for every cantonal court case. These costs include: 
– costs of continuation of wages during the proceedings;
– costs of severance pay;
– costs for (external) legal support;
– other costs.
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35. R.G. Van Zevenbergen en U.H. Oelen, ’Het duaal ontslagstelsel – beëindiging van
arbeidsrelaties in de praktijk: eindrapport’, Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werk-
gelegenheid, Den Haag, 2000 (‘Research voor Beleid 2000’).
Very recently, research was carried out at the request of the Ministry of
SZW into how employers experienced the system of prior
authorisation36. 
In the report on this research employers mention the following cost
categories as weighing heavily in order of significance:
In the case of CWI-proceedings
– Internal costs 79%
– Costs of continuation of wages 28%
– Costs of external (legal) advice 23%
– Costs of establishing a social plan in the case of collective
redundancy 8%.
In the case of cantonal court proceedings
– Severance payments 76%
– Costs of external advice 74%
– Internal costs 55%
– Costs of the proceedings 34%
– Costs of continuation of wages 9%
– Costs for mediation 4%
– Costs for outplacement 4%.
It is notable that both studies show that the cantonal court
proceedings have one important cost consideration for employers,
which is the fact that the cantonal court can award a severance
payment to the employee. This is all the more visible when we see that
in a cantonal court case the employer gains cost advantages in the field
of wage continuation. The following demonstrates this:
3.5 Costs of prior authorisation proceedings: 
wage continuation effects compared
Wage continuation depends on the length of the proceedings and the
time period between the first day of informing the employee of the
wish to terminate the contract and the final end date of the contract.
Comparing the two, the time frame with CWI-proceedings and
cantonal court proceedings is as follows:
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Cantonal court CWI
Informing employee
of the intention to terminate day 1 day 1
After short negotiation,
request for authorisation day 10 day 10
Hearing day 35 not applicable
Decision day 50 day 52
End date day 60-80 day 82-232
In both situations we assume a ten-day period for talks and
negotiations, which period is in any event necessary to give the
employee the opportunity to react to the employer’s notification of his
intention to terminate. 
In principle it should be possible for the cantonal court to set a date
within four weeks, as required by article 7:685 Dutch Civil Code. Since
the proceedings have so-called informal rules of evidence, the judge is
subsequently able to reach a decision within fourteen days. He will in
most cases declare the end date to be shortly after the date he gives his
decision, once again because the concept of article 7:685 DCC is based
on the necessity of a swift termination. The notice period does not
have to be taken into account, as the employment contract will end
through dissolution by the cantonal court. However, in some cases
cantonal court judges tend to give an extra month, if the employee has
an extremely extended notice term of, for instance, six months.
According to the Dismissal Statistics (Ontslagstatistieken) of the
Ministry of SZW regarding 2005 and the first quarter of 2006, the
maximum time needed by the CWI for handling proceedings in an
individual case is six weeks on average.
So on day 42 the CWI would be able to render a decision, but the
employer must still follow the rules of notice. The notice term may
vary from one month up to twelve months, but in most cases notice
terms will not exceed four months. 
Still, inevitably, the end date in a best case scenario under CWI
proceedings will be later than the end date in a worst case scenario
under cantonal court proceedings.
3.6 Employers seem to favour cantonal court proceedings over 
CWI-proceedings 
From the 2006 research report of Bureau Bartels37 it clearly follows
that employers favour cantonal court proceedings over CWI-
proceedings, especially in cases where there is a conflict or where an
employee’s personal circumstances are at stake. Large companies in
particular prefer cantonal court proceedings, whereas smaller
enterprises favour CWI-proceedings. Both the research reports of
Research voor Beleid of 2000 and Bureau Bartels of 2006 report that
employers favour CWI-proceedings over cantonal court proceedings
when applying for prior authorisation because of the cost
effectiveness. In fact 79% of all employers see the low cost of CWI-
proceedings (no external legal advice necessary, no severance pay) as
their greatest advantage. 
Research done in 2005 on behalf of the Dutch Organisation for
Medium and Small Enterprises (MKB)38 shows that, generally, the
members of this organisation experience the present rules of prior
authorisation as a hindrance, both to employment as well as to laying
off of staff. These small and medium sized entrepreneurs are on
average satisfied with the way the cantonal courts handle their cases,
but they are unhappy about the way the CWI handles their cases. This
is remarkable when we take a closer look at the willingness of the CWI
to cater for the needs of the employers.
3.7 Some statistics on the effectiveness of the prior authorisation 
requirement 
It yet remains to be seen in how many cases prior authorisation is
indeed granted or refused. 
3.7.1 The CWI’s willingness to serve 
A very interesting statistic deals with the number of approvals and
refusals to approve issued by the CWI39.
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37. Bureau Bartels 2006, p. 6 and 47.
38. TNS/NIPO research, on behalf of MKB Nederland, 2005.
39. Ontslagstatistieken Ministry of SZW, 2001-2005.
2005 2004 2003 2002 2001
Approval granted 85% 84% 83% 83% 83,7%
Approval refused 7% 8% 6% 5,4% 5,3%
Request for approval withdrawn 8% 8% 10% 11,6% 11%
Although these numbers do not entirely reach Ceausescu-style election
results levels, one cannot avoid the impression that the road to
termination through the CWI leads to a fairly predictable outcome. 
To dispel any doubts, this particular statistic has nothing to do with
research based upon interviews on the subjective satisfaction levels of
employers. This statistic shows the cold and hard facts of the outcome
of CWI-proceedings regarding prior authorisation. 
I do realise that these statistics still include the so-called formal
proceedings that, of course, have a 100% success rate, but taking these
20,000 or so per year out of the equation still leaves us with an overall
success rate in the remaining 60,000 or so material proceedings, where
the employee challenges the request for approval, of at least 81,25%! 
3.7.2 The cantonal court’s willingness to serve
As regards the cantonal court proceedings, it is a bit more difficult to
establish the success rates for employers. There are however three
roughly accurate sources to establish that rate. The first one is the
previously mentioned statistic on published case law, only dealing with
material cases, which shows that in 2005 in only 17 per cent of the
published cases the request for dissolution was denied by the court40.
However that figure may not be accurate as the published case law
tends to the extraordinary and we may expect the refusals to be
overrepresented. 
There are however other, perhaps more accurate sources to
approximate the success rate of requests for dissolution. Firstly, from
the research report of Bureau Bartels of 2006, it follows that 70 per
cent of the employers see as the greatest advantage of the cantonal
court proceedings: the high level of certainty on the outcome of the
proceedings. From the research done by Research voor Beleid it
follows that 87% of the employers that were interviewed had not
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experienced a rejection of their dissolution request in the preceding
two years, and this research estimates the number of rejected
dissolutions to be no more than approximately 3,5% per year.41
The statistic of published case law of course does not include the so-
called formal proceedings, as they are not in any way interesting or
otherwise fit for publication. The Research voor Beleid statistic could
however be influenced by the formal court proceedings with their
100% success rate. So when one takes these out of the equation, a
number of 45,000 formal court decisions out of the total 70,000 cases,
still a very high 94,25% success rate would remain for getting the
dissolution of the employment. I daresay Uncle Nicolae would still be
very impressed. 
I do realise that the lack of statistical accuracy here may seem to do
injustice to the learned magistrates, some of whom may even be
present in this university hall today. Any such injustice could easily be
undone by a judiciary-wide survey on all cantonal court dissolution
cases of the past 5 years, showing that my assumptions about the
eagerness of cantonal courts to terminate contracts, based on the
statistic material we do have, are wrong, to which research, by the way,
the University Maastricht would of course be glad to give a helping
hand. 
My personal conclusion, as an employment lawyer, based on the above
would be: if you want to achieve a swift and cheap termination, take
the CWI-proceedings route – satisfaction almost guaranteed with their
81,25% success rate, leaving the formal proceedings out. Yet in
practice I wouldn’t follow the CWI-route because after CWI-
proceedings, as we have seen, the employee may still file a claim for
severance pay on the ground of manifestly unreasonable termination.
The second best option would then be cantonal court proceedings,
which still yield a satisfaction-guaranteed chance of up to 94,25%, if we
would go on the estimate from 2000 of Research voor Beleid that in
only 3,5% of the cases dissolution is denied, and take the formal
proceedings out of the equation. 
The cantonal court can always dissolve, regardless of sickness or
disability of the employee, provided the ground for the requested
dissolution does not relate to the sickness or disability.
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41. Research voor Beleid 2000, p. xiii.
This shows that the main objective of the prior authorisation system,
protection of the employee against ‘light dismissal’, is in practice no
longer achieved, to put it mildly. 
3.8 Costs of prior authorisation proceedings: 
extra costs for the government 
In 1999 the Minister of SZW appointed an independent advisory
commission of experts, commonly known as the Rood-Commission
after its chairman42, more or less at the demand of the Dutch Senate,
in exchange for the willingness of the Senate to let the Flexibility and
Security Act of 1998 pass. In 2000 the Rood-Commission presented a
report in which, among other things, it investigated the financial
effects of abolition of the present prior authorisation system.
Based on its own investigative activities, data provided by the
Ministries of Justice and SZW, and research done by an independent
agency for the two Ministries at the request of the Rood-Commission,
the Rood-Commission came to the following observations regarding
the extra costs for the government in case of implementation of a
system of employment termination without prior authorisation. Before
going into these observations it should be noted that the Rood-
Commission, as its first assumption, fixed the number of prior
authorisation cases per year at 80,000, which was indeed in those years,
1998-2000, the actual total number of CWI and cantonal court cases,
and coincidentally is the same as the estimated number of cases after
1 October 2006 upon the abolition of the formal proceedings. 
The Rood-Commission then assumed that if total abolition of the CWI
as well as dissolution proceedings would be implemented, there would
be a worst case scenario of a rise in the number of cantonal court cases
for manifestly unreasonable termination to 88,000 cases. This would
according to the calculations made on behalf of the Rood-Commission
lead to an extra cost for the Ministry of Justice of R 11 million, but also
to a cost saving at the Ministry of SZW of R 9 to 11 million. 
The reasoning of the Rood-Commission on this point however
contained an important flaw. It does not take into account that a
certain percentage of the remaining total CWI and cantonal court
proceedings of 80,000, that is the remaining number of cases after
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42. Officially named: Adviescommissie duaal ontslagrecht, its report: Adviescommissie
Duaal Ontslagstelsel, Afscheid van het duale ontslagrecht, Den Haag, 2000.
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formal proceedings have finally been abolished, relates to situations
where no out-of-court settlement could be reached because either the
employer or the employee refused to settle on reasonable terms
considering the circumstances. If a legal system of severance payments
were to be introduced simultaneously with the abolition of prior
authorisation, as was the suggestion of the Rood-Commission, it is
more likely that many employment contracts will simply end with a
notice and payment of the standard legal severance payment. How
fewer cases this will result in can hardly be calculated. 
In my view there is no evidence at all upon which one could reasonably
build the expectation that the costs of a system without prior
authorisation but with the obligation for the employer to pay a
severance payment will lead to more costs than the present system. In
so far as there is a belief that at the start more cantonal court judges
would be required because of the extra influx of new cases, which I
doubt, it would seem that a large pool of experienced employment
lawyers now working for the to-be-abolished-CWI would become
available. Given the limitations posed upon me here and now I will not
explore any further on this subject, but an analysis based on recent
data should give the exact cost positions of both the Ministry of SZW
as well as the Ministry of Justice in a short time.
3.9 The cheap way out: a three-year-fixed term contract 
As I pointed out at the beginning, the Flexibility and Security in
Employment Act of 1998 created the possibility to extend fixed term
one-year contracts to up to three years. This means that an employee
who has been working in a company for three years can be dismissed
without any formality, let alone the need for any prior authorisation.
That would seem very harsh in comparison to his colleague who joined
the company on the same day on the basis of an indefinite term, and
who can simply claim protection under the prior authorisation system,
should the employer wish to terminate his or her contract after 3 years. 
But that is not all. 
Article 7:668a Dutch Civil Code, which defines the most important
rules on fixed term contracts, allows for parties to a collective
bargaining agreement to derogate from the maximum number of
contracts and a maximum period of 3 years for one-year contracts. In
2004 a research report was published by the Ministry of SZW, which
showed that in 38 per cent of the collective bargaining agreements
parties derogated from at least one of the minimum rules of article
7:668a Dutch Civil Code.
In 5 per cent of the collective bargaining agreements all limitations
on the number of fixed term contracts were set aside. In 4 per cent of
the collective bargaining agreements the maximum period of three
years was prolonged. In 2 per cent of the collective bargaining
agreements all limitations on the number of contracts or the duration
of fixed term contracts were set aside. This means that in more than 10
per cent of all the collective bargaining agreements the number of
fixed term contracts is stretched beyond the legal maximum, which
opens up new means to circumvent the prior authorisation system
even more. It would seem to me that there should be an overall non-
distinctive rule that seniority and severance rights do not start until
after an employee has spent more than – say – one year in continuous
employment with his employer. Such a rule would also be in line with
international law, such as the ILO Convention on the Termination of
Employment, which by the way has not been ratified by the Nether-
lands. The ILO Convention on the Termination of Employment aims
at providing employees with some form of protection against dismissal.
As an example article 11 of the Convention reads as follows: 
‘ A worker whose employment is to be terminated shall be entitled to a
reasonable period of notice or compensation in lieu thereof, unless he is
guilty of serious misconduct, that is, misconduct of such a nature that it
would be unreasonable to require the employer to continue his
employment during the notice period’. 
It then deals with an alternative and non-cumulative requirement: the
employee should receive either a notice period or a severance.43 In my
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43 Coming back to the French upheaval on the CPE: during the turmoil on the new
Bill, the Cour de Cassation came with an interesting ruling on the acceptability of a
trial period of 6 months (Cour de Cassation – Chambre sociale, X/Euromédia
Télévision, arrêt no. 906, 29 March 2006.). It concerned a man who was fired
during his first six months and subsequently claimed a compensation based on ILO
Convention no. 158. The French law did not offer any recourse since an employee
can be fired at will without any entitlement to a notice period or severance pay The
Supreme Court ruled that the French regulations on this point are in line with the
Convention since it concerns a permitted exception, namely ‘workers serving a
period of probation or a qualifying period of employment, determined in advance
and of reasonable duration’. A six months probationary period did in effect
constituted ‘une durée d’ancienneté raissonnable’. As rightly pointed out by the 
fi
view, in the absence of one of these two, article 7:668a DCC can be
considered to be in violation of said ILO Convention.
Moreover, as said before, the ILO Convention on the Termination
of Employment requires a severance allowance or other separation
benefits for a worker whose employment has been terminated, ‘the
amount of which shall be based inter alia on length of service and the
level of wages’.44
3.10 Some conclusions from the statistics
The two most important conclusions to be drawn from all this
empirical material are of a very different nature. The first one is that
both CWI-proceedings and cantonal court proceedings have a high
rate of success in acquiring the authorisation itself, with the CWI-
proceedings running ahead of the cantonal court competition in
circles of small and middle sized companies for reasons of cost
efficiency. One does not have to be a cynic to conclude that the prior
authorisation system no longer provides much consolation, let alone
protection to the average individual employee, when considered from
the perspective of this first conclusion.
The second conclusion is that the prior authorisation system can be
grossly unfair at certain points: I drew attention earlier to the
chronically disabled individual worker who, thanks to the prior
authorisation system, may lose his job after two years of sickness or
disability, with the possibility of not getting any compensation for his
years of service prior to his chronic disease or disability, and I also
pointed at the case of the fixed term worker, who may work three
years, and in certain collective bargaining sectors even more than
three years, without building up any rights of seniority, when it comes
down to prior authorisation or severance. 
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newspaper Le Monde, it could be argued that the 2 year probationary period under
the proposed CPE was not a ‘reasonable duration’ and could therefore be in
violation of ILO Convention no. 158 (‘La Cour de cassation reconnaît l’application
de la convention internationale du travail’, Le Monde 31 March 2006.). If the
Netherlands were to abolish the prior authorisation system, the employer would
still need to take into account a notice period, if it would wish to adhere to
international standards, particularly the ILO Convention no. 158.
44. Article 12 of the ILO Convention on the Termination of Employment.
3.11 Prior authorisation as a means to prevent termination to even be
considered by the employer
So much for the empirical angle of the triangle. The question can still
be posed: aren’t these statistics unfavourably influenced by the fact
that the prior authorisation indeed prevents employers to even try to
terminate certain employment contracts? That would lead to
termination cases not becoming actual cases in the statistics because
the employers decides the better of it, and does not request approval
of dissolution.
Let it be said, that in general it is very difficult to answer that
question very accurately, as it is very difficult in general to investigate
things that are not happening. But there are some relevant data
available. For instance, the aforementioned research reports do not
indicate that employers have difficulty in filing a request for approval
or employment: only 10% of interviewed employers in the Research
voor Beleid report saw the requirement for prior authorisation as a no-
go to their wish for termination of an employment contract45. These
research reports furthermore give the impression that employers
choose the cantonal court proceedings when they have a difficult case,
so that they at least have the odds on their side when it comes to
dissolution and subsequent termination of the contract, albeit that
they will then probably have to pay a severance. 
More importantly, as I will elaborate on in the following part of this
lecture, in most cases the prior authorisation does not help employees
because it is circumvented, lawfully or not, by the employer, or simply,
because the prior authorisation does not come into play at all. 
4. A closer look at the material effect of prior authorisation
So let me get back to the question I posed earlier, which I will now
work out in more detail. As noted, there is a triangular relationship
between employment, contract and termination, and this relationship
is characterised primarily by the principle that the weaker party of the
employment contract, i.e. the worker, should be given some sort of
protection46. The fact that this protection is much-needed can be
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46. A book that entirely concentrates on all possible aspects of this theme is Ongelijk-
heidscompensatie als roode draad in het recht, liber amicorum dedicated to prof.
Max G. Rood, Deventer 1997.
illustrated by three different categories of practical examples, in which
categories one can simultaneously test the effect of the prior
authorisation. 
4.1 First category: loss of employment on account of employee’s own
acts
The first category concerns the situation where employees lose their
employment as a result of their own doings or alleged wrongdoings.
This category can be divided into three sub-categories.
The first one deals with the situation where an employee, on an
individual basis, accepts or even initiates termination without in fact
having a genuine desire to do so. The two decisions of the Dutch
supreme court in the Ritico-case and the Van der Laan-case47 clearly
showed that by the end of the 1980s it was still not unusual for an
employee to be forced by improper means to waive his rights and be
dismissed in the process. The first case was the very banal bad movie
situation of a woman who hardly spoke Dutch, yet was asked to sign her
resignation letter by her employer. Regardless of the validity of the
reasons of the employer to terminate the contract of Mrs. Ritico, it was
clear that her resignation had to be revalidated. Yet no prior
authorisation was needed in this case, because her unconscious
voluntary resignation let to a situation where the employer could claim
no authorisation of any nature was required any more. 
Fortunately, Mrs. Ritico was saved by the supreme court that once
again48 confirmed the hard and fast rule that in case of an employee
signing his own resignation, the employer must give sufficient
evidence that the employee realised the extensive consequences of his
resignation clearly and ambiguously. So here the prior authorisation
system was no help at all Then there is one judgment in particular that
stands out, if only for its colourful name: the Je bekijkt het maar
judgment, which could be translated into something like the See if I
care!-judgement. For those of us with less fanciful minds its official title
of Westhoff v. Spronsen49 may sound more familiar. 
The case concerned a lorry driver who came back from a very tiring
return drive to Turkey and when arriving at the business premises of
his employer assumed that he would get a lift back home. This was not
29
THE END OF THE AFFAIR
47. HR 25.3.1994, JAR 1994/92; HR 8.4.1994, JAR 1994/95.
48. See also: HR 14.1.1983, NJ 1983, 457 (Hajziani/Van Woerden).
49. HR 12.9.1986, NJ 1987/267.
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the case, which led to the lorry driver shouting out: ‘I will grab my
gear, see if I care!, I won’t be coming back.’ 
The next two days nothing was heard from him, after which the
employer sent him a registered letter, saying: ‘Apparently you no
longer wish to be employed by our company, which leads us to
conclude that the employment has been terminated.’ 
Yet one day after the letter was sent the lorry driver reported back
to the employer, who did not allow him on the premises because, as
the employer claimed, the employment agreement had been
terminated by mutual consent. 
The lorry driver claimed that his employer had not met his
obligation to investigate whether the lorry driver really had wanted to
resign. This was in vain however.. The supreme court ruled that the
position of the lorry driver entailed that he could be expected to
realise the consequences of his statements and acts. The supreme
court further ruled that the employer in this case had no obligations
to investigate the driver’s intentions, having given the driver some days
to retract his statement. But the supreme court did not refer to the fact
that the lorry driver had had two days off in any event, so that he in
fact returned on the first next working day. 
Now, I will not raise the question in this lecture hall, how many
judges in the past have had momentary outbursts in the workplace,
without losing their job – many a practising litigation lawyer could be
my witness there. My key comment here is that this case of See if I care,
would have been an ideal situation where a prior authorisation system
indeed might have worked, to calm down parties before a cantonal
court for instance, and bring the situation forward, either to a return
to work of Mr Westhoff, or to a reasonable severance payment – but
because the employer claimed that the employment contract had
ended by mutual consent, no prior authorisation was necessary. 
When we look at the three cases of Ritico, Van der Laan and
Westhoff v. Spronsen, it is noteworthy that they all dealt with very
distressing situations for the employees in question, however the prior
authorisation system did not offer any meaningful contribution. In
fact, it was nowhere to be found. The workers concerned in the end
depended on the goodwill of the Dutch supreme court, which is
eminent in its development of the legal system in the Netherlands, but
it has quite a capricious way of dealing with the facts. 
A second subcategory of situations in which employees lose their
employment as a result of their own doings or alleged wrongdoings
deals with the delicate balance in dismissals for urgent cause. As a new
testament for the next millennium the Dutch supreme court ruled on
21 January 2000 in a case of a dismissal for urgent cause, that the
question whether such urgent cause existed had to be judged not only
by the doings, the qualifications and the behaviour of the employee,
but more in general by all circumstances relating to the case in question. 
This case was about an assistant shop manager of the HEMA, a
chain of stores that my American colleagues would certainly refer to as
‘so polder’. He was made redundant after nearly forty years of
continuous service of the HEMA. He was to receive a modest
redundancy payment, and was also forced to take his last two weeks off
as a vacation. On his last day at work he had his goodbye drinks with
his colleagues, in a room behind the store, at the end of which he
walked out and left and took with him out of the store two bottles of
motor oil, worth five guilders each. He was caught by security, and after
a brief suspension was dismissed for urgent cause.
Now most of the learned partners in my law firm, who have sought
more intellectually challenging fields of the law, as they say, have always
painstakingly pointed out to me that labour law is not exactly as
complicated as rocket-science. Not being a rocket scientist I always fail
in convincing them of the opposite, but the district court that decided
on the HEMA-case fortunately proved them wrong. The district court
apparently failed to grasp what was clear to every self-respecting labour
lawyer, namely that even though the assistant shop manager’s actions
formally qualified as theft, the theft in this case provided insufficient
grounds for a dismissal for urgent cause, considering all the
circumstances. Fortunately, this time the supreme court was there to
correct the injustice done.
Again, there was nowhere a prior authorisation in sight. The
assistant shop keeper had to fight for his right all the way to the
supreme court, which gave its first decision four and a half year after
the event took place. 
Furthermore, note that this case had a sequel with the supreme
court in December 2003, and was not finalised until 2004, almost ten
years after it all happened. 50
I assume that nobody will dispute that in cases like these an
employee should have adequate protection, if only against himself. But
the present prior authorisation system did not provide any protection
at all in this case, not mentioning the fact that due to lack of a swift
court procedure to establish the rights of the assistant shopkeeper, he
was forced to engage in court battles for almost ten years. 
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Then there is a third subcategory of the employee accepting his
resignation on the basis of incorrect information. Case law shows that
it happens regularly that employees are not informed, or not informed
sufficiently, about their rights to unemployment benefits, or even their
pension rights.51
Again, it goes without saying that an employee needs adequate
protection against decisions taken on the basis of incorrect information,
but in this case also the requirement of prior authorisation does not
contribute anything to the solution. It is often not until much later that
the employee discovers that his financial position, in terms of
unemployment benefits or pension, is much worse than explained to
him by his employer. By the time the employee finds out that he based
his agreement to the termination of the employment on incorrect
information, the point of prior authorisation has long passed, and it
may prove to be very difficult to get a reversal of the authorisation. The
employee may claim damages from his employer, but he has given
away his opportunity to oppose the employer’s request for
termination.
4.2 The second category: the collective dismissal
A second category regards the individual and collective redundancies.
Let us first take the subcategory of collective redundancies. These can
be based on commercial reasons or as part of a more general
reorganisation. In both cases, a prior authorisation seems unnecessary
at first glance because in the Netherlands, as in all EU countries due
to the Council Directive on collective redundancies52, labour unions
must be involved in the process of collective dismissals. In addition, in
the Netherlands the works councils must be asked for advice if the
company has more than 50 workers. 
Here, the union(s) and the employer, as a result of article 2.1 from
the Council Directive on collective redundancies, conclude a social
plan which lays out which employees, in which positions, may be
dismissed. As the Council Directive prescribes, the employer and the
unions involved should try to find ways and means to avoid collective
redundancies and mitigate their consequences as much as possible.
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52. Council Directive 98/59/EC of 20 July 1998 on the approximation of the laws of
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33
THE END OF THE AFFAIR
And if there are no unions represented in the company of the
employer, other platforms of workers representation could be involved
on the basis of the Council Directive. In a social plan, redundancy
schemes are set up to provide financial compensation, outplacement
and training allowances, all paid for by the employer. In a considerable
number of cases these social plans even contain a commitment of the
employer not to dismiss more staff than foreseen in the ongoing
redundancy process during a certain period. 
Indeed, the Council Directive on collective redundancies also
provides for notification to the competent public authority of the
projected collective redundancy. In the Netherlands, this has taken the
shape of a notification to the CWI. However, prior authorisation
proceedings through either the CWI or cantonal court are still being
applicable even to a collective redundancy where unions have
negotiated a social plan – which seems odd, because the CWI does not
materially test these Social Plans.
It is my opinion that the quasi-role of granting prior authorisation as
played by the CWI or mutatis mutandis the cantonal court does not
have any added value in collective redundancies, which I can explain
as follows. 
To make a proper assessment of the commercial or organisational
reasons presented for the dismissal desired by the employer, a good,
adequate and up-to-date level of knowledge about the business of the
employer as well as the line of industry in which it operates, is
indispensable. A presentation to the CWI of auditor statements
showing how poorly the company has performed in the past period or
how well it could perform if certain changes were carried through, add
weight to the request for a collective dismissal, but they definitely do
not constitute sufficient justification to claim that the proposed social
plan is adequate. For that conclusion to be reached, not only elaborate
discussions are needed about the developments within the company,
its line of business and its viability, but also: a detailed inspection of the
various components of the social plan, such as the financial
arrangements as well as other arrangements, for instance for training,
and, less important: arrangements for internal applications following
the reorganisation for a new position or a position at another division
of the company. 
Only the established trade unions, as is my continued opinion, are able
to do this properly, not only because the unions have adequate support
as an organisation, but also because they have sufficient authority and
support to act independently vis-à-vis the employer. Added to that,
trade unions have professional negotiators with sufficient commercial
knowledge – and not less important – sufficient self-conscience to
know when their own understanding of certain matters is such that the
advice of others should be sought. 
Especially in collective redundancies, on the labour side, all power
is collective power53. Quite so the Council Directive on collective
redundancies points at the unions to be the negotiating partner of the
employer intending to downsize his staff. Let us not forget that
negotiating a social plan is nothing but collective bargaining, one of
the primary tasks and tools of the union. One could even argue that
the role of the government-run CWI being in the position to judge an
agreement between social partners on a subject within the field of
collective bargaining is at odds with ILO Convention no. 98 on the
right to organise and the right of collective bargaining. 
One last important related aspect is that negotiators of the labour
unions are independent from the company and the interests that play
a part in the process. As an aside, this also serves to indicate that I
disapprove of works councils getting involved in the preparation of a
social plan in any other role than an advisory one: let us never forget
that members of works councils are too much involved in the business
of the employer to be able to remain fully independent in situations of
collective redundancy. 
In short, I believe that trade unions are simply much better equipped
than the CWI or the courts to negotiate a social plan at micro level and
in detail which may result in (possible) collective dismissal. 
However sometimes a court apparently feels the CWI should be the
instance to sanction a collective redundancy including a social plan
agreed upon between employer and unions. judge if all requirements
of the EU Directive on collective redundancies. This view is reflected
for instance in a rather confessional judgment by Kantonrechter
Leeuwarden54 who ruled that the CWI is better equipped than the
court to assess the merits and consequences of an intended collective
redundancy so that, still according to the Kantonrechter Leeuwarden,
the court should be reticent in passing judgment on dissolution
requests in relation to a collective redundancy. 
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I must admit that I am puzzled by rulings such as these. Not only
does article 7:685 Dutch Civil Code clearly instruct the cantonal judges
to make up their own discretionary mind on whether or not
dissolution of the contract is justified under the circumstances, but
also, taking a closer look at the EU Directive, it should be clear that it
does not purport to confer more authority on the CWI in a collective
redundancy than a court of law; rather, it merely instructs employers
to negotiate a sufficient plan with the unions. 
And let us not forget that the Dutch Supreme Court has repeatedly
decided55 that the authority of the courts to decide purely discretionary
on a request for dissolution cannot in anyway be excluded or limited,
be it by contract or in any other way, which means that no cantonal
judge may ever hide behind the CWI, even if a request for approval has
been filed with the CWI by the employer. This means that in my view
the cantonal court must simply test whether an agreement was made
between employer and unions, which provides for an adequate social
plan. The cantonal court judges acknowledge this explicitly in relation
to the issue of severance pay, now that the so-called Recommendations
of the circle of cantonal court judges, describing in detail the rules of
the cantonal court formula in the Netherlands, contain a provision
stating a social plan that has been agreed between employer and
unions should only be reviewed in terms of reasonableness56.
And still, there is no evidence that the CWI is adequately equipped to
properly assess the need for a collective redundancy and the balance
of the subsequent social plan. The CWI, incidentally, only issues
permits for collective dismissals if the unions are notified properly and
on time and are involved adequately by means of consultations and
negotiations, as provided for in the EU Directive on collective
redundancies.
So in the case of a collective redundancy, prior authorisation does not
contribute anything meaningful. 
This can hardly be surprising at all to the EU legislator if we look
again at the one role assigned to the authorities in the Council
Directive on collective redundancies. As I have quoted before, the
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Directive only requires notification of the authorities so as to enable
the competent public authority ‘....to seek solutions to the problems raised
by the projected collective redundancy’.57 It goes without saying that ‘seeking
solutions’ is something entirely different from prior authorisation.58
Here the unions play or should play a pivotal role as the serious and
critical counterparty of the employer. 
However, case law shows that sometimes a social plan is concluded
by a trade union that cannot be considered representative within the
company or within the group of workers it was supposed to represent.59
So the question can be raised whether a prior authorisation, either by
the CWI or the cantonal court, would not be sensible if the social plan
is agreed upon between an employer and a non-representative union? 
The answer is negative. The fact that an intended collective
dismissal is arranged with a non-representative union is not something
which should be applauded, but this does not imply that the CWI
and/or the court could suddenly form a well-informed opinion at
micro-economic level of all the aspects of the intended collective
dismissal. As I have pointed out above, independent and strong unions
have expertise, know the sector and perhaps also this employers
business within the sector, and even if they do not have large
membership within the employers workforce, they still would know
more of the ‘way-of-the-world’ in collective bargaining with the
employer on the consequences of a collective redundancy than a
court..
Besides, I find the shifting of the role that workers representatives
should play as counterpart of the employee to the CWI or cantonal
court judges an outright violation of the principles of the Council
Directive on collective redundancies. 
Then there is still the case of an individual redundancy without trade
unions coming into play, which in fact is any redundancy where the
number of workers that are made redundant fall under the minimum
requirement of the Council Directive on collective redundancies. Also
in those cases I doubt very much whether the CWI or cantonal court
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are sufficiently well-equipped to judge the truth and true need that is
presented to them by the employer. Not rarely, individual redundancy
is used as a means to justify the wish to terminate the contract of an
employee who for whatever reason has fallen from grace with his
employer. Individual redundancy is then used as an excuse to save on
severance pay, so that the system of prior authorisation in fact ends up
having an adverse effect for the employee
All in all, prior authorisation does not and cannot act as a safeguard
that a fair social plan is prepared in the case of an intended collective
redundancy. The prior authorisation system has no added value
whatsoever for an intended collective dismissal where a social plan on
labour conditions for the dismissed workers was agreed with the
unions. The only difference is the delay caused by the assessment
procedure by the CWI, which can adversely affect the company’s
commercial or organisational situation. In these cases prior
authorisation may have as its only result that Verelendung occurs. By
Verelendung I mean the self-inflicted downward spiral, others might say:
the negative of the Von Munchhausen-effect.
If the Dutch social partners are sincere in a shared wish to ban the
situation where non-representative unions are used to circumvent the
rights of workers in the case of collective redundancies, modernisation
of the legislation on collective bargaining agreements is the easy way
out, as I have suggested more than once60.
I make one last aside on this subject of collective redundancies. It is
notable that so seldom the redundant employees share in any of the
future profit that comes from their redundancy. 
Workers often have to leave the company so that in the future more
profit potential can be generated for the company and the remaining
workers. What these workers actually are told is nothing more or less
than: you must leave because you are a loss item. 
It has always struck me that so few social plans provide that
employees who are forced to leave should receive some kind of
compensation that can be regarded as a participation in the future
realised profits of the company. In addition to the compensation paid
out to them under the social plan, which is often very little when
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compared to the money paid out under the cantonal court formula,
why they do not receive a fair share in the future wealth of the
company? 
So far we have seen two categories of cases where it seems that prior
authorisation is given either too late or it misses its objective in those
cases where the employee has waived his rights and wants to retract
that, or in those cases where the employee is dismissed instantly by the
employer, or whose performance is otherwise judged too harshly by
the employer. 
Let us take a more detailed look at two cases where prior
authorisation might possibly be useful. 
4.3 The third category: the unbridgeable gap in the working 
relationship 
This category is all about cases relating to employees whose dismissal
is wanted by the employer, but where there is still employment and a
contract and where the facts could be labelled as debatable: should
this employee be dismissed, indeed should it be this employee who
should be fired, who can be blamed for the unpleasant atmosphere, or
are his colleagues to blame? Is it true that this worker achieved poor
results in his sales area, or are there external circumstances to blame
for this? 
Here, at face value one would assume prior authorisation could be
helpful as it allows the independent government agency CWI, or the
court, to assess whether the employer does in fact have sufficient
grounds for the dismissal. The same applies, mutatis mutandis, to the
case of a breach of trust. The relationship at work between the
employer and the employee has turned sour: something one often
finds in the situation where management policies are questioned by
only one employee, which, interestingly, happens particularly often in
cases where those policies were actually unsuccessful. In this case too,
a prior authorisation could be useful. 
Now let us take a closer look at the two main subcategories of
situations of an irredeemable breach in the working relationship.
Sub-category no. 1: the poorly performing employee
First, the case of the poorly performing employee. It has become clear
that the way this employee fulfils his job is unsatisfactory; the employer
has raised the issue a number of times and maybe the employee has
even turned down opportunities to improve his performance, like
additional training – or if he took the opportunity, the training was to
no avail.
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At a certain stage, the employer decides that enough is enough and he
wants to terminate the employment. This is not possible just like that,
since the termination will first have to be assessed by the CWI or a
court. Often, parties will start negotiations, which may often lead to a
final settlement of the employment, but for those cases no prior
authorisation is necessary. Only in a limited number of cases does it
happen that the parties fail to reach agreement, so that the
employment will continue until either the CWI or else the court has
decided whether the employer may terminate the employment.
Meanwhile, back at the workplace things deteriorate., the employee is
put on paid leave at a certain stage and finally the employer will refuse
to give a positive reference on behalf of the employee, thus drastically
reducing his opportunities on the labour market. Depending on the
quality of the legal assistance retained by the parties and the
assessment and personal preferences of the individual judge,
compensation will be awarded that can be high or low. And to make
this all even more arbitrary; if the employer decides to apply for a
dismissal permit with the CWI and the permit is granted, the employee
even receives no additional payment whatsoever. He will have to start
proceedings that can last up to a year to receive a fair compensation.
The end result here is that prior authorisation by the CWI has only
brought him out of the frying pan into the fire: the employer has a
permit and thus an alibi to dismiss the employee, while the employee
is left without compensation of any sort, for the time being. 
To those who are of the opinion that there should be cases where it is
imaginable that the employer does not have sufficient grounds for
termination, which would then mean the CWI should refuse approval,
I would like to refer again to the statistic I showed earlier, which even
after taking the so-called formal proceedings out, indicates that the
employer has a 81,25% chance of obtaining approval with the CWI. 
Of course, in the case of an unsatisfactory performance of the
employee, the employer may also choose to request the court for
dissolution of the employment. The employee has one great advantage
here: as we have seen the court can in its decision to dissolve the
contract simultaneously award a severance payment to the employee.
But practice shows that the court will dissolve the contract anyhow
because of the strained relationship between the parties. 
Even if in those cases the court awards compensation, prior
authorisation as such has only little independent meaning. On the
basis of the available research material presented earlier, one may
safely assume that the success rate on obtaining the dissolution with
cantonal courts lies at least above 94,25%. It happens only rarely that
a court refuses to dissolve an employment agreement. 
A closer look at published case law, mentioned in the research
statistics of Loonstra/Kruit, shows that this only occurs in very extreme
cases. Either the employee has almost no prospect of finding
employment elsewhere and the present employer has hardly made an
effort to heal the relationship, or the events have not created a true
relationship meltdown between employer and employee.
Once in a while we come across a truly clear example of how things
perhaps should go, if prior authorisation were really instrumental to
the system of protection. 
The case I want to describe here concerns a very recent cantonal
court decision that was not published when my lecture went to print,
but which could already be found on the internet.61 In this case the
employee had been with her employer for almost fifteen years. As a
noteworthy aside, I add that the employer in question was a legal
assistance insurance company and the employee was one of the
company doctors, who had suffered a setback in her health situation
in 2003 because of her ever-increasing workload. There were no signs
from the employer of an unsatisfactory performance until halfway62
through 2004. The employee in question started to have problems at
work when trying to cope with her workload and, perhaps more
significantly, she had to deal with a new manager at the company who
at the time was introducing new working methods. The employer
refused the employee’s request for mediation. To the contrary, it
followed the rules of the manual for beginners: sending warning
letters to the employee, refusing to talk about the employee’s
complaints about her workload, and finally putting her on paid leave
– which the employee refused to accept.
The cantonal court refused the employer’s request for dissolution
of the contract. The court ruled that the employer had violated the
principle of reticence towards middle-aged and older employees who
show signs of experiencing difficulties in performing their duties as a
result of changes in the workplace. 
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62. As we find in Kantonrechter Alphen aan den Rijn 5.07.2005, JAR 2005/254.
In my view, the cantonal court in this case applied a species of the
general rule that prior authorisation should be refused by the CWI
and/or the court if the employer has not made a reasonable effort to
ensure the employee’s employability in the workplace.63
Had the employer made such effort, then in my view there would
have been no reason for refusing prior authorisation against all odds,
and the employment contract then ought to have been terminated –
this would be without prejudice to the severance payment, because
even if the employer had done all it could to try to keep the employee
at the workplace, that would be irrelevant to the question whether or
not he should pay severance to the employee. 
But there is a certain relation to the loss of employability and
severance. The longer the period the employee has not performed
and the more opportunities he has been given to perform, the more
reason the employer has to seek termination with a lower severance
payment.64 What we see here is another example of Verelendung, the
downward spiral.
In many situations a lack of efforts by the employer to enhance
employability does not result in a refusal by the court to dissolve the
contract, but in a higher severance being awarded to the employee, as
case law on the subject shows.65 And the less the employer has made a
serious effort to keep the employee employable, the higher the
severance will be, should the court rule that continuation of
employment is not an option.66
The amount of confusion we are all experiencing in the legal world
on this subject of employability is illustrated rather unfortunately by
two court decisions last year67 in which the seniority rules (anciënniteits-
beginsel) were set aside by the court to dissolve the employment
contracts of workers with more seniority rights than their colleagues,
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as these workers, taking into account the troublesome financial
situation of their employer, were less versatile, which in my book
means: less employable, than their younger colleagues.
In one of these two cases the Cantonal Judge (Kantonrechter) Nijme-
gen even considered that ‘…it is not possible to establish whether the
employer or the employee is to be held responsible…’ for the
employee’s total lack of versatility, or should I say: employability. As an
aside; to the credit of the cantonal judge I should add that he did the
right thing by awarding the nominal severance to the employee.
I will explore the concept of employability later, but first we should
study the second subcategory of the gap in the unbridgeable working
relationship.
Sub-category no. 2: the dead-end working relationship 
The second subcategory concerns the situation of a dead-end situation
in the working relationship between the employer and the employee
without either party having any particular blame for the situation.
Here, the following scenario often unfolds. The employer indicates
towards the employee that in his opinion they have reached a dead-
end in their professional relationship and that this situation cannot
continue. 
Now if parties agree to the termination with mutual consent, with
or without a fair and reasonable severance being paid, they do not
need any prior authorisation, so neither the CWI nor the court has any
functional role.
The situation is different, of course,when parties cannot agree on
the conditions of termination. Because of the requirement for prior
authorisation, if parties cannot reach agreement, they cannot just go
their own way. One of the two will have to terminate the agreement,
but the employer can only do so if the CWI has issued a dismissal
permit, or the court has ruled on a dissolution upon request by the
employer or the employee. 
A request for dissolution, by the way, is not a course of action
embarked on lightly by the employee, as it may result in the
surrendering of certain of his legal rights. 
Employees who too easily seek dissolution of employment contracts
through the courts, often accompanied by a request for a fair and
reasonable compensation, are even in the recommendations of the
cantonal courts labelled as ‘fortune hunters’ (‘gelukszoekers’)68. This
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may lead to the employee not taking any initiative to ask for a
dissolution of the employment contract. 
On the other hand; the employer, too, may not want to take the
initiative because he may end up having to pay severance, a risk he will
not willingly take.
As long as this deadlock continues, the relationship between the
parties will only deteriorate. It is not uncommon that after a while the
employee will call in sick. From then on, the only available option is
dissolution via a court. The advantage of this option is that the level of
compensation is determined at the same time as the contract is
dissolved, but again: the only value of prior authorisation here lies in
the fact that the amount of the severance payment will be set. 
One must keep in mind that, should one of the parties have the
courage to request for a dissolution, it is certain that the court will
dissolve the contract without further delay, because as we have seen,
the starting point was that in the view of both parties their working
relationship had come to a dead-end. So again, we see that prior
authorisation does not add to the solution, it only adds to the problem. 
4.4 Prior authorisation means by definition Verelendung 
The concept of prior authorisation was originally intended as an
instrument to control and manage the labour market, so it is hardly
surprising that it doesn’t have an impressive track record in the area of
preventing light dismissals, a purpose that was only introduced in later
days. What we see is that prior authorisation comes to the rescue after
the storm in cases where the employment, validly or not, has ended
either by itself or else at least with the help of the employee.
And in cases of collective redundancies it is not prior authorisation
that can safeguard the rights of those workers who may lose their job,
but it is the unions who can and should play a decisive role; in such
cases, prior authorisation only means loss of time and thus
deterioration of the financial situation of the company that is already
facing rough times. Finally in situations where there is indeed a
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ship, not so much the contract – FG] itself requests for dissolution, for instance just
before accepting a new job, with the aim to get a severance…’: This is not the time
and place to dissect the Aanbevelingen, those very majestic, seemingly untouchable
rules set by the Circle of cantonal judges; still I think that the example of a worker
on the verge of accepting another job is not the right one; the fact that the worker
has decided to look for a job elsewhere is not of much relevance in a case where,
again ‘for instance’, the employer made his working life impossible.
possible unbridgeable gap in the working relationship, we have seen
that prior authorisation does not help. In the end, the approval or
dissolution is almost always granted, and here too, prior authorisation
only leads to a Verelendung in the situation.
So are there any positive side effects for employers or employees that
could justify the system of prior authorisation? On the contrary, as
pointed out before.
Prior authorisation is relatively expensive for employers, because it
takes an unnecessary amount of time while it does not add anything
useful in any form to the employability or the severance rights of the
employee in question.69 Then: prior authorisation carries great
injustice for the employee who is terminated with the approval of the
CWI as he will still have to start separate lengthy court proceedings to
get a severance payment, whereas the employee who is terminated
through a dissolution by the court will know by that same decision
exactly the composition of his severance package. Another injustice
relates to workers who have worked for up to three years on the basis
of fixed-term contracts and can be dismissed without any prior
authorisation, nor with any reasonable package. 
As for my criticism at the Verelendungs-effect of the prior authorisation
system, anyone can see that it is truly a very, very ineffective means of
employment protection. 
Someone who disagrees with my view might stand up and point at
the fact that there are still at least some cases in which prior approval
is denied by the CWI, or the dissolution request is rejected by the
court, so a happy ending seems to shine at the end of that individual
rainbow. Here another disappointment may follow when we study the
results of two different research reports which both show that in many
cases where prior authorisation was not granted by the CWI or the
court, in the end the employee had left the company one way or the
other within a year after the original proceedings had ended.70
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69. An interesting calculative exercise was done by G.C. Scholtens in ‘Herziening
ontslagrecht: kosten en keuzen’, Sociaal recht, Ed. 2005, no. 2, however one should
be aware that his thesis is not supported by extensive empirical research.
70. R. Knegt/A.C.J.M. Wilthagen, Toetsing van ontslag, Groningen 1988; Research
voor Beleid 2000, p. 176; I should note that Research voor Beleid 2000 does not
explicitly mention the one-year-period, but it seems that such a term is referred to
by the interviewees, as it would not make sense if their answer to the question
whether the employees stayed or left in the end would have an open ending in time.
71. J.H.M. Van Erp, Contract als rechtsbetrekking, dissertation University Brabant,
Tilburg, Zwolle 1990, p. 291-292.
So the question that inevitably spring to mind is: why do we bother
with this thing called prior authorisation? It is time to try and answer
the most fateful question of all in the polder landscape of employment
relations.
5. The End of the Affair
5.1 Introduction
Employment is not only about a contract between parties. Like any
relation between two parties, employment is also influenced and to
some extent even governed by other duties and obligations for each of
the two parties: both duties between the parties as well as duties to
third parties in or sometimes even outside the workplace. When still at
the early stages of writing my dissertation in the first half of the
nineties I found Van Erp’s general description of a legal relationship
(rechtsbetrekking)71 a very fitting description of the employment
relationship. Following Van Erp I qualified employment as a dynamic
relation between two participants in a defined sub-community,
developing in time and circumstances.72 Neither of us could foresee
that the Dutch supreme court already would define it in more or less
similar wording some years later.73
Apart from the dynamics that parties cause among each other they
must take into account the dynamics as well as the status quo of the
workplace, i.e. the institutional theory.74
The institutional theory takes as its starting point that the
workplace should be seen as a community in which rights and
obligations between the employer and the individual employee cannot
be seen separately from their place in the working community of the
employer’s business. So what happens from a factual as well as a legal
perspective between employer and employee is largely influenced by
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72. F.B.J. Grapperhaus, Werknemersconcurrentie. Beperkingen aan concurrerende
activiteiten van de ex-werknemer ten opzichte van zijn voormalig werkgever,
dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 7 december 1995, Deventer 1995, p. 28.
73. HR 14.11.1997, JAR 1997/263 (Groen/Schoevers); later even more elaborate in
HR 10.12.2004, JAR 2005/15 (Diosynth/Groot).
74. On the occasion of the discussion about HR 26.06.1998, JAR 1998/199 (Taxi
Hofman/van der Lely), an extensive overview of the various positions in Dutch
literature on the subject was given by W.A. Zondag, in his publication: Institutioneel
arbeidsrecht, RM Themis, ed. 2002, no.1, p. 4 etc.
what happens within that working community and the people
participating in it. This requires a delicate balance of all the interests
involved. One should note, of course, that the institutional theory does
not so much provide us with the solution how to deal with these
dynamics in the workplace, but only tries to find an explanation why
the contract between employer and employee cannot be approached
as a purely binary phenomenon, as Van Slooten rightly puts it.75 One
example of the fact that the relationship between employer and
employee is not merely binary can be found in the rules that apply in
a collective redundancy situation to the question of who should be
selected first for redundancy: this does not entirely depend on the
personal circumstances of the individual employee but is also largely
influenced by the composition of his peer group at work, principles of
seniority, age and education requirements. 
Another example, showing the flip side of the coin, can be found
in the Dutch Supreme Court decision of 26 October 200176. The case
dealt with an employee whose work consisted of lifting and then
weighing bags of animal food before sealing them for shipment. Due
to persistent back problems, developed at work, the employee was no
longer able to lift the heavier bags of which a small quantity had to be
made ready for shipment every hour. The supreme court then ruled
that where the employee claimed that the weighing and lifting of the
heavy bags only happened very sporadically, it could fall within the
employer’s duty to set up a scheme to ensure that colleagues would
step in every hour to help him lift the heavier bags to the scales. This
example again shows us how a working community could work –
although the story does not explain what happened in the end to the
backs and spines of the colleagues concerned.
The legal relationship between employer and employee thus is not a
one-to-one between the two. Whether or not termination of the
employment contract is objectively justified does not depend solely on
the situation between employer and employee, it also depends on
many other factors in the workplace. 
But even between themselves, employer and employee have to deal
with much more than merely contractual rights and obligations. They
have a mutual relationship that is also governed by legal requirements
46
F.B.J. GRAPPERHAUS
75. J.van Slooten, De derde in het sociaal recht, inaugural lecture, University of
Amsterdam of 18 march 2005, publ. UvA Amsterdam, p. 16-18.
76. HR 26.10.2001, JAR 2001/238 (Bons/Razijn).
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on health and safety, equal treatment, fair opportunities and
fundamental rights, ranging from the employer’s right to
confidentiality of company know-how and property rights to the
employee’s rights to privacy and freedom of speech.
Then there is still a clear distinction in a legal relationship/contractual
relationship between the contract and the relationship itself. The
strange phenomenon occurs that a relationship can be terminated
while the contract still continues. When the relationship has ended, it
is quite possible that the contract still has to be terminated. Until that
moment contractual obligations will have to be met. To terminate a
contract, certain requirements must be fulfilled depending on the type
of contract and the legal system it is embedded in.
The relationship itself, however, does not provide for any
requirements for termination. The end of a relationship means there
is no longer an ongoing relation. Whether there is anything left to be
dealt with between the parties, notwithstanding the end of their
relationship, depends on its nature and also on the contract that was
drawn up around it, as well as the circumstances under which the
relationship came into existence and was terminated. The more
permanent an ongoing relationship has been, the more necessary, or
at least the more advisable, it becomes to work out certain aspects of
the relationship in a contractual form. 
Although true that at the end of the relationship the contract itself will
still have to be rounded off, this does not alter the situation that the
contract of employment is an accessory to the relationship. It is built
completely around the existence of the relationship as a framework of
agreed components within the relationship. The contract has no
independent purpose without the underlying relationship. When the
relationship ends, the contract must take this end as a starting point
for the ‘chronicle of a death foretold’, to quote Gabriel Garcia
Marquez.
Maybe a short detour into the history of the legal system will help us
out here.
Until the late twentieth century, marital relationships entered into
in most countries, and certainly the Netherlands could only be
annulled by one of the marital parties through judicial proceedings,
provided there was a serious justification, such as adultery. However, in
many cases, one party simply wanted a divorce because that party felt
that the marital relationship was exhausted. To achieve a divorce, that
party had to either claim or admit to pretence adultery. In the last
decades before the law was finally amended, this practice of ‘pretence
adultery’ became known as ‘the big lie’. The marriage contract was
conceived at a time when the underlying relationship and the unity of
love had another meaning and interpretation; that underlying
relationship required a contractual arrangement that bound the
parties closely together – ‘till death do us part’. However, this contract
was not entirely appropriate for the new developments taking place in
the underlying relationship. This led to a situation in which the
contract continued to exist independently of the relationship it was
intended to govern, so much so that a bogus construction was
necessary to achieve the end of the contract when the underlying
relationship was already completely meaningless77. 
5.2 The end of the affair as the heart of the matter
Here we get to the heart of the matter, which is: the end of the affair. 
The end of the affair is the point where one party or perhaps both
parties are determined not to go ahead with the other. One may doubt
if at that stage a forced upholding of the underlying contract will bring
back the will to continue the affair. In employment this is in no way
different from in a relationship of a different nature. Employment is a
relation between employer and employee. And employment relates in
a ménage à trois with contract and termination. 
If the employment relationship loses its meaning, it is not realistic
to try and avoid termination – as shown by the statistics of the CWI and
the cantonal court –, and perhaps is also shown by the many employees
who according to research left within a year after their employer was
refused prior authorisation for termination. 
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77 This comparison occurred to me while working on this public lecture. The
metaphor of the ‘big lie’ has been used before by R.M. Beltzer in relation to the
formal court proceedings: R.M. Beltzer, ‘Over een opmerkelijk WW-plan’, SMA
2005, 2, p. 59-60. However, I find the metaphor less appropriate to formal court
proceedings because these proceedings relate to a lie of two parties to mislead a
third party, i.e. the body implementing the employee insurance schemes (UWV).
The matrimonial big lie is created to provide a false justification in order to achieve
a termination of a contractual relationship where the relationship itself is – in the
view of one party – already exhausted. The prior authorisation is in fact an
unavoidable false justification to be able to terminate a contract, in the case where
one party already feels the relationship is over or exhausted.
So also from this angle we may safely conclude that it is highly
questionable whether adequate protection for workers against loss of
employment and employment opportunities is to be found in
implementing some sort of authoritative customs system at the
terminus of the employment relationship.
5.3 A civil law point of view at the end of the affair
Let me first look at the concept of the end of the affair from a
theoretical civil law perspective. As I have explained, the contract is
instrumental to the relationship between parties in any sub-community,
e.g. employer and employee. In no category of contractual
relationships one would argue that the end of the relationship can be
postponed by a mere continuation of the contract. If the relationship,
the affair that started it all, is over, we must ask ourselves what that
means to the contractual and other rights and obligations the parties
in that affair have or may have expected. 
It goes without saying that unlawful termination of the relationship
may lead to contractual liability, for instance a termination that does
not follow the contractual rights and obligations of any of the parties.
But unlawful or not, it is the end of the affair if one of two parties calls
it a day – irrevocably and unambiguously. The continuation of
ordinary contractual duties and revenues is replaced by the rules that
apply to termination. 
If this were different, millions of people would still be stuck
together today, just because at some point in the past the other party
was not willing to accept that the other qualified their relationship as
finished. 
But also if a contract is terminated lawfully, the terminating party is not
simply released from any and all obligations towards the terminated
party, notwithstanding a contractual provision that makes it possible to
terminate without any obligation to compensate the terminated party. 
To understand that, we have to go back a little further, to Aristotle, who
said: 
‘… in associations for exchange this sort of justice does hold men together
– reciprocity in accordance with a proportion and not on the basis of
precisely equal return’.78
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This concept has been repeated by Pufendorf79, who wrote: 
‘A requirement of all onerous contracts is that equality should prevail in
them, or that both contracting parties receive equal benefit. Where
inequality occurs, a right arises for the party which has received less to
claim that his loss be made good, or simply to terminate the contract.’
From this, Nieuwenhuis80 derived the concept of equal exchange, or,
to put it in proper English, quid pro quo. This concept means that for
every contractual performance by one party to another in a contractual
relationship, there must be a reasonable counterperformance from
the other party – which by the way is not the same as a iustum pretium. 
Nieuwenhuis argues convincingly that81, as there is no autonomous
criterion for what equal exchange would imply, equal exchange is the
outcome of a balanced and fair negotiation and contracting
mechanism.
This concept applies not only to the contract but also to the
termination of a contract. Termination requires equal negotiating
positions. 
Termination is only equitable if two conditions are fulfilled. First, there
have to be even negotiating positions. Secondly, the end result must be
an adequate quid pro quo, by means of adequate compensation for
the loss each party suffers in the terminated contract, taking into
account, of course, who was responsible for the events and
circumstances that led to the termination. This is the case in any form
of partnership, as well as in any form of continuing performance
contract as we can see from actual case law by the Dutch Supreme
Court. 
Therefore, if a relationship is terminated lawfully, that is: in
accordance with the rules that parties agreed upon contractually in
their relationship, then the terminating party may still be liable for
certain consequences if the other party suffers from the duly and
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80. J.H. Nieuwenhuis, Drie beginselen van contractenrecht, dissertation University of
Leyden 1979, Deventer 1979.
81. Nieuwenhuis l.c. p. 58.
timely termination.82 This is one typical consequence of the fact that
the legal relationship between parties can extend beyond the limits of
their contract. 
Every permanent relationship implies an investment in its
continuation and thus in future expectations. That is not an
investment that can be written off. In fact, an investment that can be
written off implies a limited duration, while a permanent investment
assumes that the value is to be found in the continuation itself. 
The cases that came before the Dutch supreme court dealt with
distributors of large international brand names. Both the Dutch
distributor of Mattel as well as the importer of Latour wines had a right
to reasonable compensation because they had tailored their respective
businesses to a large extent to the brands and products and sales
methods of their principals. 
Hence also in case of a lawful termination of a contract one has to
account for investments that were made by the terminated party in the
relationship or to justified and reasonable expectations that were built
up with the terminated party in the preceding years. 
5.4 A view from the perspective of employee protection
The end of the affair between employer and employee in the
workplace means that there is no reasonable expectation anymore that
the problems that have arisen between employer and employee,
regardless of their nature, will be resolved – what in marital
relationships is called the irretrievable breakdown. Whether it is a
deteriorating financial position of the employer, a serious breach of
confidence due to alleged performance-related issues of the
employee, or simply the end of the road: parties, or at least one of
them, have come to the conclusion that continuation will be pointless. 
Continuing the employment relationship is a continuation of an
affair that is not wanted – and as I have shown, that will in most cases
lead to nothing but Verelendung. 
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recht 2003, p. 416 etc.
Continuation of an affair that is not wanted would not properly answer
to the requirement of equal exchange, simply because any reasonable
exchange between parties is prohibited: parties must continue a dead
end relationship.
A useful exchange and subsequent quid pro quo could be found
here, just as in every relationship that is based on mutual trust in
continuation, in the ending of the relationship and the contract in
exchange for an adequate compensation for the investments made by
the employee in the workplace, or perhaps more adequately: in the
business of the employer.
What kind of investments do employees then make in their
employment and the employer’s business? Barendrecht has described
this type of investment as employer-specific investments.83
Some examples, aimed at the employment relation, are the following. 
From the very start of their employment, individuals invest in their
working environment, by getting acquainted to their colleagues as well
as relevant contacts with their employers’ clients, purely to be able to
acquire knowledge of the workplace and to achieve a better
understanding of the mechanics at work. Also from the start any
individual will to some extent try to grasp the working processes that
are in place in his new workplace, and during his employment he will
process other innovations at work to achieve an up-to-competitive-
standards workplace. Furthermore, employees will direct their know-
how and experience towards their employer’s business needs. And
then people also invest by aligning their life outside the workplace with
that workplace, for example by moving their house and family closer
to work or if that is not possible: by investing much time in commuting
from home to work. 
Those who prefer to see this concept of employer-specific
investments as unrealistic have apparently never heard of the American
company called U-Haul. 
When I spent three weeks with my family in a camper in the western
states of the US, one night we camped on a site where our neighbours
at the next camping spot were American citizens who slept in a small
tent in front of their Buick, close to a gigantic lorry, which carried the
U-Haul sign. The man explained he had just changed jobs from North
Carolina to Oregon, so they were on their way to their next stop in life
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in Portland, with their entire belongings, great and small, in the U-
Haul truck: he was dismissed by his former employer, so he had to
leave behind a large part of what he had invested in a professional
career back in North Carolina. So much for modern time
carpetbaggers!84 And may I, rhetorically of course, pose the question
to all of you: who is still in touch with more than 5% of his former
working environment? Finally, how many times has one found that
certain knowledge on working processes or even commercial and
market knowledge became useless as soon as a change of employer
had occurred, simply because the knowledge was too closely related to
that specific employer?
It would seem that under a fair and reasonable employment law system
an employee whose contract is terminated by his employer is entitled
to a certain amount of compensation for the fact that he may leave
behind part of his professional life, investments he made in that
particular workplace and all that was attached to it. 
From a strict civil law point of view, these investments should be
compensated for if the relationship is terminated by either party for
other reasons than an urgent cause for which the employee can be
blamed. In the case of a premature termination, the employee is at
once deprived of the investment he made in this employer’s specific
business, taking into account the reasonable expectations he may have
had about continuation of the employment, given his investments. 
These employer-specific investments together constitute the stake
that the employee had in the partnership with his employer, a
partnership which was formatted as an employment contract. 
This line of reasoning by the way has a certain tradition in Dutch
employment law. Traces of it go back as far as 1947, when certain
members of the Stichting van de Arbeid, the Dutch independent
advisory body in which employers organisations and unions are
represented, expressed as their opinion that the ground for a
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severance payment was to be found in the loss of goodwill that resulted
for the employee from the termination of his employment.85
If this is all still too far-fetched to you, let me end this part of the story
with a landslide-Oscar-winning movie from 1948, ‘The best years of our
lives’. It deals with four war veterans from World War II who return
from Europe to their Nowhere Hometown, expecting to get
something in return for those best years they had invested in the war:
one is crippled, one has a severe psychosis, one is an alcoholic and
number four I always forget. They find that what they had invested in
the community by fighting a war for America is not repaid in any way.
They are not offered proper jobs or housing accommodation, they are
not helped in anyway with their problems, their country-specific
investments are lost forever. A more tragic but less glamorous variety
that will appeal even more to my dear father and many of my uncles
who had to go and fight in Indonesia in the late nineteenfourtees can
be found in one of the greatest post-war novels of Dutch literature, ‘Ik
heb altijd gelijk’, by Willem Frederik Hermans, which deals with the
disillusions of a soldier returning from the so-called ‘politional actions’
in Indonesia to the colonial homeland, that lost both the war as well as
the colony and does not want to have to cope with these returning
soldiers.
Whether it is the distributor of Mattel or the importer of Latour, the
employee who worked for twenty-five years at the same boss, or the
young professional who moved his family all the way from Amsterdam
to Deventer, or the veteran from World War II, or the soldier returning
from the politional actions in Indonesia – we all have the right to get
a compensation for what we have invested and is left as a stake in the
business we were employed at.
5.5 Severance payment as the quid pro quo
Termination of a contract, as we have seen, is only equitable if two
conditions are fulfilled: even negotiating positions, and an end result
that must reflect an adequate quid pro quo This is a very complicated
matter to realize between employer and employee in practice, as the
employer is the owner of the work and the workplace. The iniquity
between the two should be remedied.
As we have seen a prior authorisation will not work here, its unfit to
create the evenness in negotiating positions of employee and employer
– and if the statistics on the number of prior authorisations granted are
not convincing, one should just think of Mrs. Ritico, the HEMA-
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assistant shopkeeper, and See if you care. To create evenness between
employer and employee it is my opinion necessary for the employee to
have a legal basis for certainty of payment of his severance, i.e. his
share in the employer’s business, just as the ILO Convention on the
Termination of Employment describes. 
So, to avoid the situation of the heroes and villains in the
aforementioned examples, and also to provide for adequate legal
protection, not just of the employee but particularly protection of true
equal exchange or quid pro quo, it is important that when the prior
authorisation system is abolished by law, a legal obligation to pay
severance following the termination is introduced by that same law. 
An employer should then be legally bound to pay a severance pay
to his employee upon termination of the employment contract which
severance pay is to be established by a standardized calculation
method. 
That system should also allow employees to go to court in swift
proceedings, as swift as the present dissolution proceedings, to ask for
a higher severance, if the severance should have been higher than the
legal standard considering the circumstances of the case. This system
should at the same time make it possible for employers to start
similarly swift proceedings if the severance should not have been
higher than the legal standard considering the circumstances of the
case. And in those rare cases where none of the parties can justify that
indeed the end of the affair has been reached, reinstatement of the
employee by the court should still be possible.
How should the severance be calculated?
Calculating a reasonable compensation for the employee’s
investments is not as difficult as it may seem. After all, the employee
invested in his ability to work at the employer’s business for as long as
it lasted. So at the end of the affair, he should get paid an adequate
interest. This should not be confused with his wages. Wages are paid
for the work itself, they are for the driver driving the vehicle at the
instructions of the employer; whereas the ability to work is the vehicle
that is tailored to the needs of the employer. For the use of this vehicle,
the employer should pay an adequate interest. If we set this ability to
work against the total annual remuneration and apply a reasonable
and fair interest rate of 8%, the resulting severance pay, i.e. the
interest, would be one month’s salary per year of service.
5.6 Some remarks on misconceptions on the justification of 
severance payments
Perhaps this is the place to deal with the theory on the justification of
severance payments for a while and try to take away some of the
misconceptions that have been formed on this subject.86
First of all, severance payments are not meant to be used merely as
a substitute for income from labour activities in the near future: to
achieve that purpose, most countries – and certainly full-grown EU
Member States – have their own system of social security. It is not so
long ago that I disqualified the intentions of a former government to
compensate unemployment benefits with severance payments87. I
stand my ground; such a philosophy would lead to the situation where
the contributions made by employees themselves to the social security
system were in fact no more than an insurance for their own funeral:
employees would in that system contribute indirectly towards their
own severance payments.
Social security is not to be confused with compensation for early
termination of employment. The ILO has recognized this in article 12
of the ILO Convention on the Termination of Employment, that
according to its heading deals with ‘several allowance and other
income protection’. Not only in that heading, but also in the article’s
text a clear difference is made between severance payment, under
subparagraph (a) and unemployment insurance under subparagraph
(b).
To make the comparison with marital law again: it would be the
same mistake to confuse alimony payments with the appropriation to
the other spouse of his or her part of the matrimonial property. 
Also, I fail to see why the mere legal ground for severance pay would
be compensation for cooperating with a peaceful separation, as some
have suggested in the past. Such reasoning would take the principle of
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the ILO that lasting peace can only be established when it is based on
social justice 88 to an extreme. 
Strictly speaking the legal ground for a severance payment is found
in the fact that the contract is severed by one party, and that in such
case a quid pro quo in paying out the employee’s stake in the
prematurely ended relationship with his employer is paid out.
Whether such severance is due, and how much is due will then entirely
depend on the circumstances. The fact that the employee is willing to
cooperate with a peaceful settlement may perhaps in some cases lead
to a higher severance, based on the principle of ‘nuisance value’, but
is certainly not a ground in itself for severance. A different view might
in fact make severance nothing more than ransom money. 
Yet the prior authorisation system has created this effect: if you do
not pay what is due we will not let you out of this employment contract
– but as we have seen in the beginning, that was never the original
purpose of the introduction of the prior approval system by the CWI
in World War II. 
I must disappoint any optimists here today once more: researchers
from the University of Amsterdam already in 199989 reported that it
occurs that the CWI is willing to cooperate with a prior approval of
termination, provided the employer promises to pay a certain
severance. And when it comes to the cantonal courts, the judge must
in an interim decision indicate to the employer what severance he will
award should the employer maintain his request. The employer can
then withdraw his request and pretend a happily-ever-after with the
employee. This has led many times to the practice of employees, after
the withdrawal of the employer’s request, filing their own request for
termination, asking for the severance payment that the court had
already announced it would award. And to make life an even greater
mystery, it then happens ever so often that the court in fact dissolves
the employment contract, but awarding a different severance to the
employee in the process. One might say that indeed the path of the
lord is dark and rarely pleasing. 
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88. Philadelphia declaration of the ILO, II.
89. R.M. Beltzer, R. Knegt, A.D.M. van Rijn, Ontslagvergoedingen, ’s-Gravenhage 1999,
p. 69.
5.7 Severance payment as a stop to light dismissals
As I have pointed out it is not easy to say very accurately what effect a
prior authorisation system has on employers for not bringing forward
light dismissal cases. This would be the same in a system where
protection does not so much come from prior authorisation but from
a legal obligation to pay a severance in case of a termination of
employment. In the research reports of both Research voor Beleid as
well as Bureau Bartels one can find that employers at least know where
they stand when it comes to cantonal court proceedings: they do
realise at least by approximation the price they may have to pay to the
employee by means of severance pay. A legal standard for severance
pay should however, as in the French Code du Travail be accompanied
by the possibility for employees to ask for a higher severance if the
dismissal is unfair. The one-plus-one of a legal standard for severances
and a possibility for an extra severance to be adjudicated by the court
makes this form of protection system very effective, as it will discourage
the employer in any intention he might have for a light dismissal, as
one may assume that he will not easily want to pay a considerable
severance amount. And if he still wants that, then the employer simply
should pay.
5.8 Employability 
There is still one remaining issue: where does this leave the principle
of employability? I am not as cynical about the concept of employability
as Lord Wedderburn expresses, where he merely places it in the
context of the need that capital has for employable workers. To the
contrary, the right to employability should be seen as a consequential
right to the worker’s fundamental right to pursue their self-
development.90
In a modern society an employee is helped more with employability,
training or education, social security and support on the labour
market in securing a new job, than with a prior authorisation scheme.
The European Directive on collective redundancies very clearly
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90. Also to be read in par. II of the Philadelphia Declaration of the ILO; I have more
elaborately worked on this thesis in F.B.J. Grapperhaus, Werknemersconcurrentie.
Beperkingen aan concurrerende activiteiten van de ex-werknemer ten opzichte van
zijn voormalig werkgever, dissertation, University of Amsterdam, 7 december 1995,
Deventer 1995, p. 92-94.
describes this in article 2.291, where it defines the aim of the
consultations between employer and workers representatives in case of
a collective redundancy: that consultation is inter alia meant to
‘…cover ways and means of (….) mitigating the consequences by
recourse to accompanying social measures aimed, inter alia, at aid for
redeploying or retraining workers made redundant.’ 
In my view employability, training and social security are indeed very
relevant for the proper functioning and competitiveness of a labour
market. But they operate in a parallel universe in a different ménage à
trois of work, training and social security. Work can only be found and
continued if a person has a certain minimum level of capability and
willingness to be trained, also to prevent him from falling back upon
the minimum of social security.
One should bear in mind carefully that employability does not mix
well with the employee’s entitlement to a severance that both mirrors
and adequately compensates him for the investments he made in his
employer’s business, just as Mattel and Latour received their
compensation for the investments they made in their respective
principal’s business. 
Whether an employer should be rewarded for actively investing in
the general employability of his employee remains to be seen. In my
view it should be possible to create a system in which employees build
up training rights through a special individually earmarked budget
paid for and retained by the employer. Yet I would not want to go so
far as suggested by Verhulp92 to create what he calls a ‘backpack’-
model, which completely transforms the severance payment into
training. My first objection is a principled one. The compensation for
employer-specific investments is an individual right of the employee
and I see no legal ground why that employee could be forced to spend
acquired compensation rights for a specific purpose, i.e. education or
training. Secondly, it is not easy to establish a model in which all
various types and levels of training, and even more importantly: need
and want for training, could fit in. And thirdly, employability is a
responsibility for all concerned: employee, employer as well as
government. 
But I do agree with Verhulp that a certain obligation needs to be
imposed on the employee so as to ensure that he will at least be
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91. European Directive 98/59 of 20 July 1998, Eurlex 31998L0059.
92 E. Verhulp, Ontslagrecht in beweging?, l.c., p. 22-23.
involved himself in maintaining or even increasing his employability,
or should I say employability rate. However I find that such obligation
should be linked more to social security than to termination and
severance. As I have set out earlier, the triangle of work, education and
social security has its own existence in a universe that is parallel but still
not the same as the one of employment, contract and termination. 
6 Is a system of prior authorisation through either a 
government body or an independent court the 
appropriate method of protection for employees 
against undue termination? And what could be a 
practicable alternative?
Prior authorisation does not serve the purpose of protecting employees
from undue or unjust loss of their jobs against their economically
much stronger employers. It is counter-productive in the few situations
where authorisation is denied, as in those situations it only creates
Verelendung. 
It increases costs needlessly; money that could have been spent for
better purposes, for instance on something like employability. 
It creates great injustice for employees with fixed-term contracts,
long-term disabled and chronically sick employees. 
It is hypocritical to the extent that in the vast majority of cases prior
authorisation is granted anyhow either by the CWI or the cantonal
court – and it does not in any way serve as a meaningful instrument on
the greater labour market. 
In this lecture I have not even addressed the fact that the CWI is
considered by many lawyers as an institute of which the mere existence
– let alone its modus operandi – is a flagrant violation of the European
Treaty on Human Rights, as is the present form of the dissolution
proceedings before the cantonal court with its lack of appeal options:
I think the polder parties would be willing to except such minor
shortcomings, provided the system of prior authorisation had proven
to be a useful tool for a more equitable employment system.
Prior authorisation is ineffective when it comes to protection to
employees against loss of employment. And it is an anomaly in modern
times when we realise that the end of the affair means the contract will
lose its raison d’être. 
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On many occasions I have referred to Paul van der Heijden’s
metaphor of the contract as the ‘ticket to ride’93 for the employee. 
Perhaps prior authorisation is then best characterized as a ‘ticket to
leave’ – which once again brings some harrowing thoughts to my
mind.
In this lecture I have pointed at the tension that lies in the triangular
relation of employment, contract and termination. This triangle is not
sufficient to help us explain why a system under which prior
authorisation is required for termination of employment does not
provide adequate protection. A more fitting ménage à trois is perhaps
that of protection, cost and practicability. Protection has its cost and it
would seem that parties can only gain from the protection and use of
the incurred costs if the protection is construed and managed in a
practicable way. 
Both the labour market as well as the legal system to which it applies
must take care of the protection of employees in such a way that the
employee can return to work as soon as possible in the best possible
circumstances. 
A legal obligation to pay severance on the basis of set standards,
accompanied by a social security system that puts more emphasis on
education and training, would be a much better option for effective
protection of employees against loss of their employment.
In the beginning I stood still very briefly at the Villepin-proposal
that caused riots in France in the early spring of 2006. I am very much
against a system that would make dismissal of certain groups, be it
youths or elderly people, easier than of other groups. If there should
be any difference, it can only follow from the true different aspects of
the workers in question relating to their employment, such as the years
they have been employed by their employer, their salary position, the
job requirements and the training and experience they had before the
job. 
I would call for a protective system based on the following
principles.
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93. P.F. van der Heijden in his contribution to: De arbeidsovereenkomst in het Nieuw
BW, Deventer 1991, p. 10 etc.
Outline in ten rules of a new system for the Dutch polder on the protection of
employees against termination of employees
1. An employment contract can only be terminated on valid grounds
as set out in article 4 of ILO Convention on the Termination of
Employment, which means reasons connected with the capacity or
conduct of the worker or based on the operational requirements of
the business. In accordance with ILO Convention on the
Termination of Employment, article 11, a reasonable notice term,
preferably one to two months, should be observed. 
2. If the employer terminates, he must pay a legally standardized
severance payment. 
3. If the termination occurs as a result of or in relation to events or
circumstances – and now I am more or less copying from the
French labour law as codified in the Code du Travail94 – for which
the employer is to blame or which are his responsibility, the
employee may seek resolve for a higher severance pay than would
follow from the legal standard through swift court proceedings.
Such circumstances also include the situation in which the
employee is not properly heard by the employer on the intended
dismissal (along the lines of article 7 of ILO Convention on the
Termination of Employment). If the termination occurs as a result
or in relation to events or for which the employee is to blame or
which are his responsibility, the employer may seek resolve for a lesser
severance pay than would follow from the legal standard through
swift court proceedings. 
4. The legal standard on severance payments shall relate to the loss of
the employee’s stake in the employer’s business, and will be
calculated on the basis of one month gross employment income per
service year. 
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94. Code du travail, art. L 122-14-4 and more or less L 122 14-5; the latter deals with
smaller enterprises and only makes ‘abuse of dismissal’ qualify for extra severance,
whereas bigger enterprises fall under the scope of the aforementioned L 122-14-4
that provides for extra severance in case of a dismissal on ‘unserious grounds’.
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5. If the employer has terminated for invalid grounds, i.e. other
grounds than capacity or conduct of the employee, the employee
may either opt for the court to reinstate him in his position with the
employer or opt for a considerable extra severance. If the employer
has through his own conduct caused the employee to terminate the
contract, the employee may in the same swift court proceedings
claim a severance which the court may or may not adjudicate. 
6. If the employer feels that he has increased the employee’s
employability considerably during his employment contract, he
may also bring this forward as a circumstance that might to a
limited extent lead to a lower severance. On the other hand an
employer who has merely profited from his employee and has not
in any way given the employee the opportunity to develop his skills
or know how, may face a higher severance.
7. A severance payment can be paid as a cash payment, be it tax
efficient or not, but also partly in other forms, such as payment of
post-employment education or coaching or outplacement.
8. In case of a collective redundancy the same rules will apply unless
the employer and the unions reach agreement on a different
calculation method, which may be the case if the employer’s
financial status does not allow for a social plan based on payment of
the full legal standard. In such a case, the employer and the unions
may agree upon giving redundant employees part of their
entitlement by means of a share in prospective results of the
employer’s business in the near future.
9. Proceedings should take place before an independent court, with
expertise in labour law. The employee may be represented by
himself or be represented by anyone he deems fit, regardless
whether it is a union representative or a professional lawyer. 
All claims of an employee or employer relating to a termination of
the employment will expire irrevocably one year after the end date
of the employment. 
10.Any fixed term contract may have an accumulated duration of
maximum one year. After that every contract is an indefinite period
contract. Every indefinite period contract is governed by the rules
of notice term and severance pay as described above. 
‘Labour is not a commodity’ as the Philadelphia declaration clearly
states in its preamble95. This means that a worker deserves adequate
protection not only if he or she is wronged by an unfair termination of
employment, but also if he or she is terminated lawfully, yet is not
compensated for his personal investments in the employer’s business
and the loss of opportunities as a result of the termination. 
The mechanism of adequate protection needs to be re-established in
Dutch employment law. Meanwhile, we should not forget that the true
challenge does not lie in saying farewell to regulations that still date
back to the upside-down-world of the German occupation, but in
further research on how we can manage true and efficient
harmonisation of the EU labour markets and the applicable rules, to
the benefit of our competitiveness as European Union, and
subsequently to the benefit of the workers who built up the common
market. This lecture should therefore not be seen as an example of the
ambitions I have set for my position here in Maastricht. 
It is my goal to work towards more integrated cross-border research
on the mechanics of employment markets and their legal systems and
I feel assured that the University of Maastricht and more specifically
the capacity group that I am part of will provide the best possible
environment to start up such research.
Before ending this lecture I wish to address several people in the
audience today who have played a certain role along the long and
winding road leading to the Minderbroedersberg.
First of all there is Arnold Keizer who has been a very welcome critic
of my endeavours and who certainly ‘pimped’ my lecture, without him
I would perhaps never have found out about the link between
Pufendorf and Nieuwenhuis. 
Then, my English is a mixture of seventy percent Monty Python,
twenty-nine percent Beatles and a mere one percent legal English.
Thanks to Robert-Jan de Bruin, for his editing this strange brew;
I am grateful to have Leonard Verburg around in my practice group as
an inspiring counterpart, but even more Sietze Hepkema who on quite
a different level was a very laidback coach through my far-too-many-
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95. Philadelphia Declaration of the ILO.
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daydreams over the past six years, simultaneously dealing with my
tempers;
Then there is Aalt-Willem Heeringa who, although my first
introduction was rather chaotic from behind the wheel of a 1957
Mercedes during a rally, has made great effort to build the chair that I
now sit on since January this year;
Malva, Wilfried and Edith, who have whole-heartedly accepted me in
their midst, as is evidenced by the mouse pad of Saskia’s computer;
Saskia, I quite owe you for the way you have stood up in 2005 to make
my position as European employment and simply employment
professor possible, when let us say times were a little hard; your gift for
coaching the four of us and also getting in the money we need for our
little sub-group, is only equalled by my capacity to show you how you
can efficiently make use of your computer, your inbox for instance;
Paul van der Heijden, when I heard you describe the qualities of Max
Rood as a tutor in a very moving speech you made in December 2001,
I must admit that I thought you were giving a description of yourself;
you have always been a perfect guide with vast amounts of patience for
an uncontrollable entity like myself, and playing an important part in
my being here as well;
Then there is Ad Geers; how much I would have liked to address him,
I had found the fitting indecent quotes to address him already last
winter, when I heard about his much too soon and tragic death; I think
I am finding my way around at the University by myself, but I can
assure you, without Ad there is definitely less spirit;
I definitely wish to address my father, who never showed the least of
concern when during my younger years I showed more interest in
learning the Top Fourty songs out of my head and always, always kept
believing in me, well here’s to you, I was so much older then, I am
younger than that now, so: I have hidden a string of song titles in my
lecture, let us see if your brilliant historian’s mind can find them;
I will briefly say a word to my mother, who was born in this town and
had to leave for Amsterdam with her mother, three brothers and four
sisters when she was eight years old, after her father, my grandfather,
had suddenly died. This great misfortune happened in the midst of
the depression years. Yet you have always told us, Ankje, Marjan and
myself, that you only have recollections of Maastricht as an everlasting
summer town, which was the ultimate argument to make me choose
for this University; 
My children Ferdinand, Christine, Valentijn and Max, it is each of your
own specific personalities that have inspired me all those years to plead
the case of the individual as being special and deserving individual
attention;
Finally Florentine, it is you who learned me to finally grow up and
show some personal development myself, where would I be without
you? Not here today.
Ik heb gezegd.
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